

MIGRATION AND THE UNITED NATIONS POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA



International Organization for Migration (IOM)

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


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Foreword and Introduction



Foreword

We live in an era of unprecedented human mobility. Not only has migration become an everyday reality, but there is supportive evidence that human mobility substantially contributes to progress for achieving most of the Millennium Development Goals. The drivers of human mobility are such that large-scale migration will continue to be a “megatrend” in the twenty-first century.

Approximately 1 billion of the world’s 7 billion people are migrants. Some 214 million are international migrants. Another 740 million are internal migrants. South-to-South migration is now just as important in volume as South-to-North migration, and North-to-South migration is a growing phenomenon.

Migrants are instrumental for the development of both sending and receiving countries. Many professional, technical and service circuits would not function without the human, economic and cultural capital that migrants bring to their countries of destination. In parallel, communities of origin benefit from migrant remittances, which account for a significant share of the GDP of many developing countries. Increasing acknowledgement is given to contributions of diaspora groups and transnational communities: mobile populations facilitate trade, investment, skills transfers and cultural linkages between countries. Human mobility helps to reduce the extent and magnitude of poverty, by assuring employment for a growing world population and favouring valuable use of development resources complementary to aid budgets. In addition, migration helps improve school attendance rates, empowers women, and facilitates mitigation of health-related issues, such as child mortality rates. Increasingly relevant is the leverage of migration for resilience-building and prepared response to emerging global risks, such as natural disasters or slow-onset effects of climate change. As a result, if well managed and appropriately factored into development planning, migration is an enabler of sustainable development.

In October this year, the United Nations General Assembly will, for only the second time, discuss migration and its contribution to development. The second United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development takes place at a critical time, as the international community seeks agreement on a United Nations post-2015 development agenda. Although there were references to

migration in the Millennium Declaration, specific goals or targets for migration were not included in the Millennium Development Goal framework itself.

In short, migration is a key factor in major development questions and solutions, and it is essential that it be incorporated into the future development agenda. The authors of this volume highlight numerous reasons why migration should be factored into the post-2015 development framework. The chapters outline the different ways in which migration can contribute to development, and discuss how migration can most effectively be included in the United Nations post-2015 development agenda.

We hope that this book will serve as a valuable contribution to the forthcoming discussions at the second United Nations High-level Dialogue, and that its findings will generate substantive debate on the modalities of the post-2015 global development agenda, for the benefit of all.



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Introduction

Frank Laczko and Tara Brian¹

A Nepalese migrant domestic worker says of her migration experience: While working in Hong Kong I experienced many things...I have gained much experience and my confidence has grown. Now I have a say in decision-making at home....I have bought a piece of land and four rickshaws and I am creating a means of livelihood for four other families (DFID, 2007:11).

Context

In October 2013, the second United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development will be held in New York,² presenting the international community with a valuable opportunity to focus its attention on how to make migration work for poverty reduction and sustainable development. The second High-level Dialogue will take place at an important time, as the international community considers moving beyond the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and towards the formulation of the United Nations post-2015 development agenda.

There were references to migration in the 2000 Millennium Declaration, such as the need to combat human trafficking and protect the rights of migrants, but specific goals, targets and indicators for migration were not included in the MDG framework. This book examines the case for integrating international migration into the post-2015 development agenda.

As the 2015 deadline for realizing the MDGs approaches, the United Nations system has embarked on a process to establish global support for a successor framework. This process has two key phases. The first phase, now in progress, consists of the United Nations system's internal and external consultations on the lessons learned from the MDGs and on emerging challenges. The second phase, starting in September 2013 with United Nations Member State negotiations, is intended to lead to a United Nations summit on development in 2015.

Although we do not yet know precisely what the new global development agenda will look like, it seems likely that it will retain the best of the MDGs, but also go beyond them (United Nations, 2013). In July 2012, the High-level Panel of Eminent

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² The first United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development was held in 2006.

Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda was established by the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon. The High-level Panel was tasked with making recommendations on the development agenda beyond 2015, and produced its report in May 2013.

There is agreement that the strength of the MDGs lies in their clarity and the fact that they are based on an unprecedented global consensus. It is also evident that progress has been made towards the achievement of the MDGs. According to the High-level Panel report, during the last 13 years, the world has witnessed the fastest reduction in poverty in human history: there are half a billion fewer people living below the international poverty line of USD 1.25 a day than when the goals were set in 2000. During the same period, child mortality rates have fallen by more than 30 per cent, and deaths from malaria have fallen by one quarter. While these changes cannot be attributed to the MDGs alone, the report argues that “it would be a mistake to simply tear up the MDGs and start from scratch.” (United Nations, 2013). The new development agenda needs, therefore, to build on the MDGs, but go much further.

The High-level Panel report argues that a new development agenda is required given changes in the development context since 2000. For example, population dynamics are changing: since 2000, there are now 1 billion more people in the world, and half the world’s population now lives in cities. Yet, despite these and other developments, including, inter alia, population ageing in much of the industrialized world, the emergence of new migration hubs in the “South”, increased numbers of internally displaced persons due to natural and man-made causes, and so on, there are insufficient new policy, technical and cultural instruments to respond to the changing population dynamics. Furthermore, the High-level Panel report also notes that aid flows have become much less important than private investments in developing countries. To take but one example, since 2000, migrant remittances to developing countries have increased from USD 81.3 billion to USD 401 billion in 2012, and are estimated to reach USD 515 billion in 2015 (Ratha et al., 2011; World Bank, 2013). Migrant remittances are now three times as great as official development assistance. Despite this astonishing increase, and the pivotal role of migration in shifting population dynamics, migration has never been fully factored into the MDG framework.

The authors of this volume argue that there are good reasons why migration should be factored into the post-2015 development framework. Each of the chapters considers the different ways in which migration can contribute to development, given the right policy framework. The contributors to this volume also discuss how migration could be included in a post-2015 development agenda. Although all agree that the case for including migration in the framework is strong, views differ on how this could be done.

Case for integrating migration into the post-2015 development agenda

The chapters of this book consider the case for integrating migration into the future global development agenda. Three overarching arguments are made. First, it is argued that migration is simply too important in scale to be ignored. One in seven of the world's population is a migrant, including some 214 million international migrants, and 740 million internal migrants. In addition to these figures, many more people in the world have been migrants at some point in their lives and have now returned home – such as international students and temporary workers. Migration also leads to the creation of diasporas – emigrants and their descendants who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin. Thus, the impacts of migration extend far beyond migrants themselves; an agenda which ignores the broad reach of migration risks not only neglecting the often unique needs and vulnerabilities of migrants and their families, but also of overlooking the vast impacts of migration on the development of cultures, societies and economies around the globe.

Second, migration can help individuals and their families to increase their incomes, develop new skills, improve their social status, build up assets and generally improve their quality of life (DFID, 2007). As the UK Department for International Development has noted: “If well managed, migration has the potential to support the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and to improve poor people's lives” (DFID, 2007:2).

The development potential of migration is multifaceted. For one, a growing body of research suggests that remittances, which are often used for education, health and housing, can help to achieve the MDGs (IOM and UN DESA, 2012:5). As noted above, international officially recorded remittance flows to developing countries have grown significantly in recent years, and it is estimated that informal remittances may be 50 per cent higher than recorded flows (Ratha, 2012). By 2030, there could be 30 million more migrants, remitting an additional USD 60 billion to their home countries (United Nations, 2013:18). Substantial evidence exists to suggest remittances may play a positive role in education. Additionally, they may support the achievement of health-related MDGs, such as reducing child and maternal mortality. However, in this regard, remittances must be considered as complements to health aid and the development of public health sectors in underserved areas.

There is strong evidence that remittances have a significant impact on the reduction of poverty. Findings from Nepal, for example, show that almost 20 per cent of the decline in poverty between 1995 and 2004 can be attributed to the remittances sent back home by labour migrants (European Union, 2013:173). Furthermore, diaspora groups and remittances can play an important role in supporting populations in origin

countries caught in crises, whether due to natural disasters, conflict or economic downturns. While remittances continue to improve the development outcomes of many, international and national interventions can make the difference regarding their developmental impact.

Remittances are not the only channel through which migration affects development. Less obvious are the “intangibles” of “social remittances” that migration brings, for instance by increasing trade flows, and facilitating the transfer of skills, knowledge, values and innovation (IOM, 2013). Diaspora groups, consisting often of several generations of migrants, can be particularly effective due to their connections to and knowledge of both sending and receiving countries. Furthermore, migrants play a key role in promoting economic dynamism in the countries in which they work, often filling labour and skill gaps. In the light of demographic changes in much of the industrialized world, the role of migrants will become increasingly important to fill specialized high-skill positions, as well as meet additional labour needs, for instance in the health and human care sectors. Furthermore, some research suggests migrants may have more “entrepreneurial spirit” than native-born (IOM, forthcoming). While the emigration of highly skilled workers (often referred to as “brain drain”) can have negative implications for the development efforts of small developing economies, particularly in crucial sectors such as health and education, recent research has shown that the migration of highly skilled workers can have benefits for both sending and receiving countries, even more so with effective policy measures and enabling environments (IOM and UN DESA, 2012).

An additional consideration is both the effect and the impact of migration on environmental changes and events. In 2012 alone, an estimated 32.4 million people in 82 countries were newly displaced by disasters associated with natural hazard events (98% triggered by climate- and weather-related causes) (IDMC, 2013) and this excludes those compelled to move due to slow-onset processes, such as desertification and sea-level rise. Furthermore, large-scale migration, if inadequately managed, can have deleterious effects on the stability of host environments and communities by increasing pressures on land and water resources, particularly relevant in rural areas (IOM, 2010). These considerations make it evident that migration must be included in disaster risk reduction and adaptation strategies.

Third, the impact of migration on development is far reaching, affecting a growing number of countries around the world, including many countries in the global “North”.³ Remittances do not simply flow from rich to poor countries, and migration is not simply a South–North phenomenon. According to the forthcoming *World Migration Report 2013: Migrant Well-being and Development*, only 40 per cent of

³ While varying definitions exist, “North” generally refers to high-income, or developed, countries. “South” refers to all other countries (namely, low-, lower-middle-, and upper-middle-income countries).

the world's migrants surveyed during the period 2009–2011 moved from South to North, 33 per cent moved from South to South, 22 per cent from North to North, and 5 per cent from North to South. As migration increasingly occurs between developing countries, and between countries of the North to the South, remittance flows have been changing. For example, it has been recently calculated that two thirds of the remittances received in the least developed countries are sent by migrants residing in other developing countries (UNCTAD, 2012).

Migration from North to South (or from high-income to low- and middle-income countries) has been particularly neglected in research on the impacts of migration for development. It is estimated that between 3 per cent and 6 per cent of all international migrants have moved from North to South (IOM, forthcoming). These global figures, however, do not fully reflect the recent increase in North–South migration that has occurred in some parts of the world, for instance the increased movement of unemployed young people from Europe to destinations in Latin America and Africa (Laczko and Brian, 2013). For example, in 2008 and 2009, an estimated 107,000 individuals left Europe for countries in Latin America, particularly Argentina and Brazil (Córdova Alcaraz, 2012). These emigration flows have an influence on the flow of remittances, helping families in Europe to cope with the unemployment crisis (Stratfor, 2013). It is estimated that some 200,000 people left Portugal between 2011 and 2012. Portuguese citizens living abroad sent EUR 2.45 billion in remittances in 2012, up from EUR 2.42 billion in 2010, according to the Bank of Portugal. In contrast, remittances sent from Portugal fell to EUR 528 million in 2012, down from EUR 585 million in 2011, as a growing number of migrants returned home (Stratfor, 2013). Ireland is another country that has been hit hard by the eurozone crisis, as the numbers of people emigrating has soared. The World Bank estimates that Irish citizens living abroad sent EUR 570 million home in 2012, up from EUR 450 million in 2007 (Stratfor, 2013). The economic impact of remittances in Europe is still relatively low, less than 1 per cent of GDP in Spain and Ireland, but as much as 2 per cent in Portugal. The development of Portugal therefore increasingly depends on its migrants living abroad. These examples highlight the wide-reaching impacts of migration, affecting development outcomes in both the South and in the North.

It should not be forgotten, however, that migration is associated with risks and can potentially have negative consequences for migrants and countries of destination and origin. Many migrants, especially those in an irregular situation, may be vulnerable and disadvantaged compared with the local population. For instance, migrants who use irregular channels to migrate may find themselves in a situation where they feel unable to approach the authorities to report abuses or assert their rights because of their irregular status. Furthermore, both irregular and regular migrants may not have access to social protection and may be subjected to unethical labour recruitment practices, xenophobia and discrimination, not to mention the

vulnerabilities of those in more precarious situations, such as trafficked persons and unaccompanied migrant children. As IOM and UN DESA (2012:7) highlight: “The contribution of international migrants to both countries of origin and destination depends crucially on whether their human rights are safeguarded and they are protected from discrimination.... Any discussion of the contribution of international migrants to development should thus include a consideration of their human rights.”

United Nations system recognition of links between migration and development

Although migration was not factored into the MDG framework, it has been part of the United Nations broader development agenda for some time. Several international agreements recognize the importance of migration to sustainable development.

As early as 1994, for example, 179 Member States of the United Nations adopted the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development. The Programme of Action includes one chapter entirely devoted to international migration, and another chapter focusing on population distribution, urbanization and internal migration. For example, the Programme of Action calls upon all States to:

Encourage more cooperation and dialogue between countries of origin and countries of destination in order to maximize the benefits of migration to those concerned and increase the likelihood that migration has positive consequences for the development of both sending and receiving countries (UNFPA, 1995).

More recently, the report of the United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 United Nations Development Agenda (United Nations, 2012) recognized migration as a key dimension of global population dynamics and an enabler for inclusive social and economic development. IOM and UN DESA (2012) outline the important ways in which migration can have an impact on development. The significance of migration for development is further underscored by UN DESA (2012), which notes that migration is the big hole in the traditional development agenda, and states that:

The importance of international migration cannot be overemphasized. It is a powerful force for social change and cultural interaction and has significant impacts on the development process and functioning of modern economies. Migratory pressures are bound to increase in the future... (UN DESA, 2012:47).

At the regional level, the contribution of migration and development has also been recognized by one of the world's key development donors, the European Commission. In a recent communication, the Commission states: "Maximising the positive impact of migration on development is an important policy priority for the EU" (European Commission, 2013).

Despite such pronouncements, at the country level, migration is rarely fully integrated into national development plans, and development practitioners often remain sceptical about the benefits of migration for development (Riester, 2013). How to convince the development community that migration is not too politically toxic a subject to be included in the development agenda remains a challenge. Peter Sutherland, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Migration, states that: "Typically, development experts regard migration as a sign of failure: if development policies work, people should not want to move....but migration should not be considered good or bad; it is simply natural to the human condition" (Sutherland, 2013).

Other reasons why migration has not been integrated fully into development plans are a lack of migration data and indicators, and because migration is a fragmented portfolio falling under the responsibility of various government departments (IOM and UN DESA, 2012).

How to include migration in the post-2015 development agenda: Goals, targets and indicators

Each chapter in this volume discusses different ways in which migration might be integrated into a future post-2015 global development agenda. A number of chapters discuss possible goals, targets and indicators related to migration and development. These terms are briefly explained below, following the framework outlined in the recent report by the High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (United Nations, 2013:57).

- *Goal* – expresses an ambitious, but specific, commitment. Always starts with a verb action. Possible examples for migration could be: eliminate human trafficking; reduce remittance transaction fees; lower the financial costs of migration; increase the number of countries that integrate migration into development planning; increase migrants' access to health care.
- *Targets* – quantified sub-components that will contribute in a major way to the achievement of a goal. They should be an outcome variable. Examples for migration could include: reduce human trafficking by 50 per cent by 2030; lower average remittance transaction fees by 20 per cent by 2030; reduce the cost of obtaining a visa or passport for travel by 25 per cent by 2030; ensure that over 50 per cent of countries integrate migration

into national development plans by 2030; increase the health coverage of migrant populations by 50 per cent.

- *Indicators* – precise metric from identified databases to assess if the target is being met (often multiple indicators are used). Examples for migration could include: number of trafficked persons; cost of remittance transactions; cost of a visa or passport; number of development plans that include significant references to migration; comparison of maternal mortality between migrants and resident populations.

It is likely that most of the proposals for post-2015 goals will be few in number to force choices and establish priorities (United Nations, 2013). In the case of migration, authors in this volume essentially focus on three main considerations, as outlined below.

First, there is an argument that migration is an important cross-cutting issue that can act as an enabler of development. Migration can have an impact on the achievement of many different kinds of MDGs whether related to poverty reduction, health, education or the environment. It is therefore essential that any future monitoring framework include measurement of the impact of migration on these sorts of development goals.

Second, it is recognized that migrants can find themselves in a very vulnerable situation, especially when migration is forced or when it occurs through irregular channels. The new global development agenda should “leave no one behind”, in the words of the High-level Panel report (United Nations, 2013). This implies a need to be able to develop indicators to track the well-being of migrants compared with other groups in society to ensure that they are not excluded from development gains.

Third, some argue that the post-2015 framework should not only focus on goals, but should also be about instruments (European Union, 2013). Development progress is also about implementing policies that create an environment conducive to development. The MDGs are not only a list of goals on development outcomes; they also include a call for progress on the use of certain instruments under MDG 8 which are grouped under the heading “develop a global partnership for development.”

In a recent position paper, IOM proposed a migration target as part of a global partnership for development: “to create cooperative agreements related to human mobility to enable safe, lawful, less costly migration across or within borders, which will ensure the protection of the human rights of migrants and produce positive development outcomes for all stakeholders” (IOM, 2013).

Agreeing on goals, targets and indicators is likely to be a considerable political challenge given that, to date, States have agreed on relatively few goals, targets and indicators relating to migration and development. An exception to this is the case of remittance transaction fees, where countries have agreed on targets to reduce remittance transaction costs following the G20 Summit that took place in Cannes in 2011.⁴

There is also a considerable technical challenge: data on migration and development remain poor. Although there is an increasing amount of research on the effects of migration on development, global and regional monitoring of migration's impact on development has been limited.

Outline of the book

Migration and the United Nations Post-2015 Development Agenda is a compilation of articles that have been previously published for various purposes and audiences, each one presenting a different case for the inclusion of migration in the post-2015 framework. As such, the book may be read from front to back – giving the reader an overview of principal arguments – or each chapter can be viewed as a stand-alone composition. The book seeks to draw together differing perspectives that present various aspects of the debate – from addressing the role of labour migration and migrant health in the development agenda, to the feasibility of including migration within a global partnerships goal. In this way, we hope to provide the reader with a broad introduction to the thought process surrounding migration's place in the United Nations post-2015 development agenda.

Chapter 1, by Paula Lucci and Pedro Martins, provides an overview of the multiple ways in which labour migration can contribute to poverty reduction and development in both migrant-sending and -receiving countries. Not only can those who migrate improve their own economic situation, but the money they send home – remittances – can have a large impact on the opportunities available to family members. Furthermore, migrant-receiving countries stand to gain from a more dynamic labour force, particularly in the light of ageing populations and decreasing fertility rates in much of the industrialized world. However, migration is a politically sensitive area, something that can lead to obstructions to collaboration and policy formation domestically as well as regionally and globally. In conclusion, the chapter presents a discussion of how migration could be factored into the United Nations post-2015 development agenda.

⁴ In the final declaration of the Cannes Summit, held on 3 and 4 November 2011, the G20 Heads of State committed to work to reduce the average cost of transferring remittances from 10 per cent to 5 per cent by 2014.

Acknowledging the clear links between migration and development, Chapter 2, by Anna Knoll and Niels Keijzer, delves into the dialogue surrounding migration's place in the post-2015 agenda. While migration has been recognized as an important factor in global development, precisely how it could be meaningfully included in the post-2015 framework is less clear. The authors present four possible scenarios for the inclusion of migration in the future agenda: (a) as a stand-alone goal, involving a target relating to migrant rights, or a reduction in the costs of migration; (b) as a sub-objective under various thematic development goals and targets; (c) as an enabler of development that cross-cuts multiple aspects of the development agenda; and (d) within a goal for greater global partnership on international migration.

In Chapter 3, Philip Martin highlights three primary channels through which international labour migration has the potential to contribute to the achievement of development outcomes: recruitment, remittances and returns. By demonstrating how each of these three “Rs” is linked with development in both migrant-sending and -receiving countries, Martin suggests possible indicators for inclusion in the post-2015 development agenda. Recruitment indicators could involve improved monitoring of recruitment agencies and greater transparency and standardization of costs and how they are distributed between workers, employers and other parties. Remittances, perhaps the most recognized link between migration and development, can be monitored by both macro- or national-level indicators and micro- or household-level indicators, demonstrating their effects both on national economies and on individual, family and community development. Regarding returning migrants, little is known about numbers, basic demographics and motives for return, let alone levels of savings and how returnees engage themselves upon reaching their countries of origin.

The topic of migrant health and its critical links with global health and development outcomes is addressed in Chapter 4, by Davide Mosca, Barbara Rijks and Caroline Schultz. The chapter explores why and how migration-related health challenges should be integrated in the post-2015 development framework, arguing that migration can be a key social determinant of health not only for migrants, but also for their home and host communities. Acknowledging health as a prerequisite for development, the authors argue that the post-2015 development agenda on health must include explicit reference to the migration-related determinants of health.

A key aspect of the post-2015 framework proposed by the United Nations System Task Team is the inclusion of a core set of “development enablers” (United Nations, 2012). Chapter 5, by Chris Richter, proposes migration as such an enabler, raising the questions of how migration acts as an enabler of development; how the concept of a development enabler can be operationalized; how it relates to a possible set of development goals, targets and indicators; and how such a concept can be measured and evaluated. Richter concludes by highlighting that the potential of migration to act as a development enabler is contingent on the migration process

itself being safe, humane and orderly. In this respect, effective policies are crucial for migration to achieve its potential for development, and incorporating migration into the post-2015 development agenda can play an essential part in this.

The final chapter, by Sarah Rosengärtner and Lars Johan Lönnback, delves further into the how of including migration in the post-2015 agenda, highlighting the value of a partnership approach to incorporate migration in the agenda. The chapter presents several models that have been proposed for partnerships in the post-2015 framework: (a) one global goal on partnerships for development, similar to the current MDG 8, but equipped with measurable targets and indicators; (b) a partnership created in line with each thematic goal; and (c) a whole set of global partnership goals that would cover key enablers of human development, and would complement the set of human development goals focused on ends, rather than means. The authors present an initial discussion of what various migration-related global partnership options might look like, including those addressing remittances, human mobility, health, and resilience and disaster risk reduction.

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
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Chapter I



CHAPTER I

Labour migration in the post-2015 development agenda⁵

Paula Lucci and Pedro Martins⁶

I.1 Introduction

Migration is the oldest action against poverty....What is the perversity in the human soul that causes people to resist so obvious a good? (Galbraith, 1979)

As the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) deadline of 2015 approaches, discussions about what could replace them are gathering pace. There is no shortage of proposals on how the Goals could be improved to reflect development challenges that were not as salient in the early 2000s. For example, there have been suggestions to place a stronger emphasis on growth, employment, equity, political accountability, security, environmental sustainability and resilience – to name a few (Melamed, 2012).

Migration did not feature in the Goals. MDG 8 aimed to develop a global partnership on key policy areas, which would be instrumental to achieve Goals 1 to 7. It included issues related to trade, debt relief, aid and knowledge transfer, but migration was not mentioned. Should migration feature in the debates about a future global agreement on development this time round? Despite the obvious political sensitivities, issues that go beyond the traditional development cooperation agenda – such as migration – deserve to be brought to the table.

Many have argued that (labour) migration can be an important tool to reduce poverty (Clemens and Pritchett, 2008; Galbraith, 1979). A recent review of empirical estimates suggests that the free movement of people across borders can generate overall economic gains ranging between 50 per cent and 150 per cent of world GDP (Clemens, 2011). Furthermore, studies looking at the distribution of these

⁵ This chapter was originally published as a research report by the Overseas Development Institute (P. Lucci and P. Martins), Post-2015: Can we talk about migration? ODI, London, 2013 Available from www.odi.org.uk/publications/6719-post-2015-can-talk-about-migration.

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gains suggest that they can have a strong poverty reduction effect by increasing labour earnings of migrants, as well as through the impact of remittances on source countries (Fernández-Huertas and Rapoport, 2011). At the same time, migrants can play an important role in filling labour shortages and thus contribute to a more dynamic host economy.

Despite this increasing evidence, migration is rarely seen as a development issue, and, in practice, labour mobility remains heavily restricted. There are both economic and non-economic reasons that help to explain why this is the case.

Although there is some agreement that increasing labour mobility would generate net overall benefits, there can also be redistribution effects and (short-term) costs. These will ultimately depend on the characteristics of migrants and labour market conditions in both sending and receiving countries (Skeldon, 2003). For instance, workers in receiving countries fear that increased competition from unskilled migrant workers may lead to lower wages or even unemployment. Although the evidence suggests that these effects are either absent or small – especially when compared to the magnitude of the gains (UNDP, 2009) – they matter to those groups affected and by extension to politicians. In some cases, governments may need to implement supporting policy measures to minimize potential transitory negative effects.

In addition, some have questioned the extent to which the poorest households can actually benefit from greater labour mobility. Migrating often requires significant financial resources (e.g. to cover transport and settling costs) and social networks, which might not be available to all strata of society. Consequently, migrants and remittances may not be necessarily linked to the poorest households and regions.

There are also concerns related to social cohesion, national security and public services capacity. Even if these issues in most cases lack a strong empirical grounding, politicians in receiving countries tend to be overwhelmingly cautious – largely due to voters' negative perceptions of migration.⁷ Moreover, politicians in source countries may be concerned about “brain drain”, although the evidence appears to be mixed. Therefore, it could be argued that those interested and (directly) benefiting from migration are left with no clear advocates.

However, some of these views may change when confronted with strong external pressures. The most obvious will come from ageing populations in developed and

⁷ Pritchett (2006) provides a comprehensive analysis of the constraints to increased labour mobility, arguing that these are shaped by several “immovable ideas”, including: (a) taking nationality as a morally legitimate basis for discrimination; (b) thinking of development exclusively in terms of nation States (rather than nationals); (c) assuming that increased migration of unskilled labour will lower wages (or take jobs away from natives) and worsen the distribution of income in the receiving countries; and (d) assuming that migrants are a fiscal cost because they use more services than they pay in taxes.

some emerging economies – a migration “push” factor. This will lead to increasing demand for young workers as these economies face labour shortages and the associated negative economic consequences (e.g. fiscal imbalances) that could severely affect living standards.

Other factors could also contribute to changing current perceptions of migration, but their influence is likely to be weaker than that exerted by demographic pressures. Migration related to natural disasters and conflicts – a “push” factors – may force global actors to reconsider their approach to migration. In addition, the case for greater international labour mobility could be much better articulated – partly by highlighting the existing evidence on the benefits for both receiving and source countries, and by working more closely with diasporas.

In this chapter, we discuss international migration in the context of the post-2015 debate. While recognizing that internal migration is also highly relevant, we focus on the international dimension in order to narrow the scope of the chapter.

Our main objective is to consider if and how international labour migration could be adequately incorporated in a future global development framework. For instance, the role of labour migration as an additional tool to reduce global poverty (and demographic deficits) could be mentioned in a general narrative or statement on the goals, in a strengthened MDG 8, or in national road maps to achieve the goals.

With only two years remaining, expectations on what could be effectively achieved on this future agenda are fairly modest, particularly taking into account the dangers of overloading an already complex process. That said, at this stage it is important to be ambitious, since the political process will eventually narrow down the scope of the issues to be addressed. Ultimately, there is an intrinsic value in having discussions that contribute to raising awareness and improving the quality of the debate on the role of international migration in development.

The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 reviews some of the pressures for increased labour mobility and outlines key migration trends. It also provides a brief overview of the empirical evidence on the impact of migration in source and destination countries. Section 1.3 describes the political economy of migration, and reflects on why it remains such a politically sensitive issue. Section 1.4 outlines existing policies and proposals on migration policy. Section 1.5 concludes by reflecting on how migration could be integrated in a post-2015 development framework.

I.2 Trends and evidence

Pressures for increased labour mobility

Pritchett (2006) refers to a number of “irresistible forces” that have amplified the pressure for increased labour mobility across countries. These include: differing demographic trends, especially with regard to the size of the working-age population; large wage differentials, particularly for unskilled workers; significant gains from increasing labour mobility compared with further liberalization of trade and capital; and the rise of employment in low-skill (non-tradable) services, such as personal and health services. These seem to be further facilitated by declining transport and communication costs (Mayda, 2011).

In this section, we focus on demographic pressures and high global income inequality, since these are probably the most noticeable pressures for increased labour mobility.

An ageing population

The world population is rapidly ageing in both developed and developing countries. These increases in the median age are mainly due to lower fertility rates and declining old-age mortality. Consequently, the old-age dependency ratio is projected to increase significantly over the next few decades – from 0.12 dependants in 2010 to 0.26 dependants by 2050. The situation is particularly dramatic in Europe, Japan and China. For example, the old-age dependency ratio in China is projected to increase from 0.11 in 2010 to 0.42 in 2050, whereas in Europe it is expected to grow from 0.24 in 2010 to 0.47 in 2050 (UN DESA, 2011a).

These demographic trends are particularly worrying when considering that ageing populations will increase the demand for health services and old-age pensions, reduce the tax base and deteriorate current account balances – through the impact on national saving rates. Indeed, ageing is expected to intensify already noticeable pressures on fiscal and external balances in many developed countries. A natural policy option would be to increase the retirement age, in order to ease the increasing burden placed on the working-age population. However, this strategy is likely to face some political obstacles, while its success will ultimately depend on whether the elderly will be in sufficiently good health to work productively (“healthy life expectancy”).

In this context, easing barriers to international migration appears to have the greatest potential to solve some of these structural deficits, especially by rejuvenating ageing populations in advanced and emerging economies. Indeed, there is likely to be a fierce global competition for young workers, especially once India and China

reach their population peaks in the next few decades. Nonetheless, migration does raise issues related to social integration (and possibly urbanization) that ought to be carefully considered.

High global income inequality

The concept of global income inequality considers inequality among world citizens, regardless of national borders. Recent estimates suggest that about 9 per cent of the world population receives 50 per cent of global income, while the bottom half of the population – namely, the poorest 50 per cent – receive about 7 per cent (Milanovic, 2011a). Current levels of global inequality are said to be the highest in human history.

It is particularly interesting that the main factor driving this inequality appears to have shifted from within-country to between-country differentials. Milanovic (2011a) argues that about 60 per cent of income dispersion is currently due to the country of citizenship, compared with less than 20 per cent for parental income class. This suggests that citizenship (in a context of restricted international migration) can be seen as an important “rent”. Clemens and Pritchett (2008) also look at a similar issue. They estimate the average income of people born in the same country – namely, “income per natural”, irrespective of where that person now resides – and compare this with the traditional measure of income per resident. Their results confirm that the (in some cases large) differences between the two indicators are largely explained by the effect of international migration (where you live) rather than “selection” (what you know).

Given this evidence, the economic incentives to migrate are becoming stronger, and measures to stem migration are unlikely to be effective – but rather may encourage irregular migration. In the absence of large global income redistribution mechanisms (e.g. public transfers across countries) or faster catch-up by developing countries (i.e. convergence), a reduction in global inequality can be achieved only through greater international mobility of labour (Milanovic, 2011b).

Migration trends

Fairly limited movement across borders


Despite growing pressures for increased migration, labour mobility remains fairly restricted by current policies and is low by historical standards.

Historical trends tend to challenge the perception that we currently live in a period of very high migration. For instance, the late nineteenth century was a period of mass migration. During the period from 1870 to 1910, the annual net migration rate was at 12 migrants per 1,000 inhabitants in Argentina, 7 per 1,000 in Canada and

Australia, and 4 per 1,000 in the United States of America. In terms of emigration, the rate was 11 per 1,000 in Ireland, 9 per 1,000 in Italy, and between 2 and 5 per 1,000 for Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Great Britain (UN DESA, 2004). Hence, many countries in the developed world that are considered traditional receiving countries actually experienced higher (relative) migration flows in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century than those occurring today.⁸ As a share of the world population, the nineteenth century was a period of higher international mobility than the twentieth century (UNDP, 2009). For instance, almost 15 per cent of the population of the United States was foreign-born in 1910, while in 2000 this figure was just above 10 per cent (Mayda, 2011).

Migration flows slowed down significantly between 1914 and 1950, partly due to the First and Second World Wars and the Great Depression. These events contributed to more restrictive immigration policies (Chiswick and Hatton, 2003). Since then, and coinciding with a period of strong economic progress, migration flows started to increase once again. Figure 1.1 shows that Europe became a net recipient of migrants in the 1960s, but that its rate remains fairly low – just above 2 per thousand inhabitants. It is possible that North America's higher net migration rate is related to public perceptions and policy stances that have been shaped by its history of immigration.

Figure 1.1: Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)



Source: UN DESA (2011a).

⁸ Williamson (1998) suggests that mass migration during the late nineteenth century significantly contributed to the convergence of real wages across the Atlantic (i.e. between Europe and North America).

Moreover, labour mobility remains heavily restricted – especially when compared with the international movement of goods and capital. The current stock of international migrants is estimated to be at 214 million (as of 2010), which corresponds to only about 3 per cent of the world population (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1: Migration flows


	Stock of immigrants (billion)				Annual growth (%)	Share of population (%)		Emigration rate (%)
	1960	1990	2005	2010	1960–2005	1960	2005	2000–2002
Africa	9.2	16	17.7	19.2	1.7	3.2	1.9	2.9
Asia	28.5	50.9	55.1	61.3	0.7	1.7	1.4	1.7
Europe	17.5	49.4	64.3	69.7	2.9	3	8.8	7.3
LAC	6.2	7.1	6.9	7.5	0.2	2.8	1.2	5
N. America	13.6	27.8	45.6	50	2.8	6.7	13.6	1.1
Oceania	2.1	4.4	5.5	6	1.7	13.5	16.4	4.9
World	77.1	155.5	195.1	213.8	1.1	2.6	3	3

Source: UNDP (2009).

Historical trends show that the international migrant stock increased from 2.6 per cent of world population in 1960 to 3.1 per cent in 2010, whereas imports of goods and services increased at a much faster rate, from 12.1 per cent of world GDP in 1960 to 28.1 per cent in 2010 (Figure 1.2). This seems to support the hypothesis that the pace of trade liberalization has been much faster than that of international labour movements.⁹ Restrictive migration policies are likely to be the main explanation for the surprisingly small magnitude of international migration, rather than people's lack of interest to move abroad (Mayda, 2011).

⁹ However, people are less mobile than goods and services, partly for social reasons.

Figure 1.2: Migration and trade openness



Source: World Bank (2012).

Diversification of migration destinations

Another relevant trend is the large movements of people between developing countries – referred to as South–South migration. Migration from developing to developed countries (South–North migration) is estimated to account for 35 per cent of the total, while South–South migration amounts to 34 per cent – a further 25 per cent corresponds to migration between developed countries (UN DESA, 2011b).¹⁰

According to recent estimates, the stock of migrants born in the South and residing in the North has increased faster (85 per cent, from 40 million in 1990 to 74 million in 2010) than the stock of migrants born in the South and living in the South (22 per cent, from 60 million in 1990 to 73 million in 2010) (UN DESA, 2012). However, it is important to highlight the weaknesses in the data, as in many developing countries there are no reliable figures for the population of immigrants. In some cases, particularly in the South, borders may be crossed with minimal formalities. This suggests that figures for migration between developing countries are likely to be underestimated (Ratha and Shaw, 2007; Bakewell, 2009).¹¹

¹⁰ “North” and “South” are broad categories and both bundle together very different countries and regions based on criteria relating to economic development and income (for a discussion of definitional issues, see Bakewell, 2009). In fact, high-income countries that are not members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and economies such as Hong Kong (China), Singapore, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are often included under the “South umbrella” (Ratha and Shaw, 2007).

¹¹ Differences in the measurement of migration between countries (e.g. foreign-born versus nationality), as well as reporting lags in census data pose further difficulties (Ratha and Shaw, 2007).

Given that North and South are broad categories – that group together countries which may have markedly different experiences with migration – it is important to look at regional dynamics and specific migrant corridors. The majority of migrants live within their region of origin, with the exception of those from Latin America and the Caribbean – explained by the significant migration to North America, particularly the United States (Table 1.2). Proximity, among other factors such as historical ties and the presence of social networks, is important in shaping the movements of people. This is more so in the case of migration between developing countries of similar income levels. The prospects of greater income differentials, as in the case of South–North migration, means people are prepared to travel longer distances (Ratha and Shaw, 2007).

Table 1.2: International migrant stocks (2010)

		Destination (millions)						Total	Origin (%)
		Africa	Asia	Europe	LAC	N. America	Oceania		
Origin (million)	Africa	15.5	4	7.7	0	1.7	0.4	29.2	53
	Asia	1	46.1	19	0.3	14.2	2	82.6	56
	Europe	0.8	7.8	37.3	1.5	9	2.4	58.7	63
	LAC	0	0.6	3.9	4.6	23.5	0.1	32.8	14
	N. America	0.1	0.5	0.9	1	1.4	0.2	4.1	34
	Oceania	0	0.1	0.3	0	0.3	0.9	1.6	57
	Various	1.8	2.1	0.9	0.2	0	0.1	5.1	
	Total	19.3	61.3	69.9	7.7	50	6	214.2	
	Destination (%)	81	75	53	60	3	15		

Source: UN DESA (2012).

Within different regions, it is possible to identify important migration destinations. For example, West African migrants from Sahel countries often chose to migrate to relatively more prosperous and politically stable coastal countries, such as Ghana and Senegal. South Africa is another well-known receiving country in Africa. Within Latin America, Argentina (for migrants from Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia), Costa Rica (from Nicaragua) and Mexico (from Honduras and Guatemala) are all important migrant destinations. The same can be said of India (for migrants from Bangladesh and Nepal), Malaysia (from Indonesia) and Thailand (from Myanmar) (Bakewell, 2009; Zoomers and van Naerssen, 2006).

With regard to specific migration corridors, the largest are found between the United States and Mexico; Bangladesh and India; Turkey and Germany; India and the United Arab Emirates; the Philippines and the United States (Ratha and Shaw, 2007).

In terms of the types of flows, there seems to be an increase in temporary and circular migration, rather than the permanent and unidirectional flows observed in the past.¹²

To conclude, future demographic trends and high income inequality across world citizens suggests that there will be a growing interest in using international migration as a policy tool to address inherent structural imbalances. The fact that migration flows remain relatively low – largely due to policy restrictions – implies that there is plenty of scope for further action. The next section looks at the economic evidence on the impact of migration on development.

Impact of migration and remittances

Economic theory posits that the movement of labour across borders has the potential to produce significant economic gains. This is partly because migration enables people to specialize and benefit from their relative strengths (UNDP, 2009). While a significant share of these gains will accrue to migrants themselves, residents in source and destination countries are also likely to benefit from greater labour mobility.

There is a growing body of empirical evidence suggesting that increased migration flows can generate very large aggregate benefits. Clemens (2011) reviews recent estimates from the literature and finds that eliminating (all) barriers to labour mobility can generate economic gains between 50 per cent and 150 per cent of world GDP. These gains are much larger than the potential benefits that would accrue from further liberalizing trade and capital flows. To a certain extent, this is due to the fact that the liberalization of labour movements has significantly lagged behind that of trade and finance.

While the full abolition of migration controls is politically unfeasible and possibly undesirable, the fact that migration flows remain heavily restricted suggests that the rewards from even small changes in policy could be very significant. Walmsley et al. (2011) estimate that a small increase in South–North migration – equivalent to 3 per cent of the labour force in developed countries – would increase world GDP by USD 288 billion. Most of these gains would be generated through increased quotas for unskilled labour and would accrue to migrants, host country residents, and home country residents (via remittances). Van der Mensbrugghe and Roland-Holst (2009) suggest even greater aggregate economic gains.

¹² Circular migration can be defined as the recurring move between source and destination country in order to carry out seasonal or temporary work (UNDP, 2009). It can be contrasted with permanent and return migration.

Migration can have significant poverty reduction effects. Clemens et al. (2008) find large wage gaps between migrants in the United States and residents in the respective source countries, even when controlling for observable characteristics (e.g. education, age) and selection bias (e.g. greater entrepreneurial tendency among those who migrate). For example, migrating to the United States may increase an individual's real wages by 200 per cent, 250 per cent and 680 per cent for Guatemalans, Filipinos and Haitians, respectively, after adjusting for purchasing power. The authors argue that migration barriers (which largely sustain this "place premium") represent "one of the largest remaining price distortions in any global market", which could even be seen as a form of wage discrimination. Thus, crossing international borders could be a vehicle to promote economic development and reduce world poverty. Milanovic (2011b) makes a similar case for migration as a tool to reduce global income inequality.¹³ Nevertheless, some have questioned the extent to which migration can help the very poorest – see Skeldon (2003) – since migrating often requires significant financial resources (such as to cover transport and settling costs) and the existence of social networks in countries of destination, which might not be available to the poorest households.

Impacts on source countries

Another channel through which migration affects poverty reduction and development is the remittance flows accruing to source countries. It is difficult to estimate the real magnitude of these flows since many remittances are transferred through informal channels and are therefore unrecorded. Even then, estimates suggest that remittances are often larger than other financial flows to developing countries – such as official development assistance and portfolio investments.¹⁴ Furthermore, remittances tend to be more stable and counter-cyclical than other private flows, as the experience of the recent global crisis illustrates. Workers' remittances are particularly important for poor households, as they enhance consumption levels and can provide a vital safety net to protect against economic shocks. There is also evidence that remittances contribute to better outcomes in health and education (Ratha et al., 2011).

In addition, remittances can be an important source of foreign exchange for many poor countries – even if there are some concerns about real exchange rate appreciation. More recently, securitization of remittance flows has enabled developing countries to leverage private finance from international capital markets. Lastly, there has been an increased interest in tapping resources and knowledge from diasporas, namely through the issuance of diaspora bonds to finance public infrastructure projects.

¹³ For instance, the author argues that wages for unskilled workers in rich countries can often be 10 times higher than those in poor countries, suggesting that the (individual) gains from migration are great.

¹⁴ In 2010, migrants from developing countries sent more than USD 325 billion in (officially recorded) remittances to their home countries – about three times the volume of official development assistance (Ratha et al., 2011).

Ratha et al. (2011) calculate that sub-Saharan African countries could raise between USD 5 billion to USD 10 billion per year through diaspora bonds.

The empirical evidence on the impact of workers' remittances on GDP growth is not conclusive, possibly because remittance flows might be counter-cyclical – namely that they increase during economic downturns in remittance-receiving countries. Moreover, since they often finance consumption over investment, they are unlikely to be a dynamic and sustainable source of economic growth. Their impact on economic activity is likely to be mainly felt through indirect channels, such as by funding education and health expenditures, smoothing consumption patterns and improving financial intermediation (Ratha et al., 2011). However, there is also evidence that workers' remittances can have an important and direct impact on poverty levels. For instance, Adams and Page (2005) demonstrate that international migration and remittances significantly reduce the level, depth and severity of poverty in developing countries.

There are some concerns that migration, particularly of skilled workers, may lead to brain drain in source countries, thus undermining human capital accumulation and socioeconomic development. However, the empirical evidence tends to be mixed. For instance, Easterly and Nyarko (2008) suggest that brain drain is actually likely to produce a net benefit in source countries in Africa – based on calculations for Ghana. This is partly because the benefits accruing to migrants and their families (via remittances) can outweigh the losses due to brain drain (for instance, remittances could make education accessible to migrants' siblings who remain in the source country).¹⁵ Moreover, improved migration prospects may have a beneficial impact on skills accumulation – which more than compensates the loss of skills due to emigration – leading to an actual “brain gain” (Stark et al., 1997).¹⁶

Lastly, trying to stem emigration might not be particularly effective without addressing the incentives for migration. Countries could focus their resources on tackling migration “push” factors, such as the lack of economic opportunities, natural disasters and conflicts.

Impacts on destination countries

In terms of the specific effects on employment prospects and wages of residents in destination countries, Ortega and Peri (2009) find that immigration increases

¹⁵ However, these benefits tend to accrue to the household, while the costs might be borne by society.

¹⁶ Batista et al. (2012) provide empirical estimates of brain gain for Cape Verde. The authors suggest that an increase in the “probability of own future migration” increases the “probability of completing intermediate secondary schooling” for individuals who do not migrate before the age of 16. Some argue that migration could incentivize over-investment in fields that have a higher demand abroad. However, there is little evidence on this beyond anecdotes (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011).

employment and does not crowd out residents in destination countries (natives).¹⁷ In addition, the authors' simulations suggest that investment grows rapidly, increasing GDP in the receiving country without affecting average wages or labour productivity. In fact, labour productivity (and thus wages) might actually increase as low-skilled immigrants are willing to perform jobs that are unattractive to locals – encouraging a stronger focus on more productive jobs – while high-skilled migration promotes innovation. Mouhoud et al. (2011) argue that a zero-migration scenario could reduce employment and GDP growth by a significant amount in developed countries – especially in Europe and the United States – when compared with a standard baseline scenario. In contrast, the authors estimate that a doubling in net migration rates would considerably boost GDP growth and employment levels.¹⁸

The available evidence suggests that the impact of increasing competition for low-skilled jobs is either negligible or small when compared to its gains (UNDP, 2009). However, while the gains are usually shared across society (e.g. through lowering consumer prices), the potential negative impacts are likely to be borne by specific groups. In that case, governments could implement policies to minimize these transitory effects, such as through re-training programmes to improve the skill set of local workers, thus increasing their employability as well as overall productivity and dynamism of the economy. Furthermore, governments can ensure that the wider economic benefits from migration are equitably shared among the population (e.g. through income redistribution). Identifying and exploring labour market complementarities (between local and foreign workers) is also crucial to boost the positive impact of migration on the host economy.¹⁹

Destination countries may face additional important challenges, such as the social integration of immigrants and the potential fiscal costs of providing social services (Ratha et al., 2011). These are valid concerns that will need to be carefully addressed. For instance, governments could adopt policies that facilitate the integration of migrants in society and highlight the benefits of diversity, thus promoting social cohesion. Moreover, the potential fiscal costs associated with hosting migrants need to be compared with the benefits of greater economic activity and thus tax revenues. Since migrants are typically young and healthy, they are unlikely to be heavy users of public services. In fact, the net fiscal contribution from immigration will depend on a number of factors, such as the characteristics of migrants, their impacts on the labour market, and the characteristics and rules of the welfare system. Evidence for the United Kingdom (and several other countries) suggests

¹⁷ It could also be argued that new migrants are more likely to compete with previous waves of migrants, rather than with native workers.

¹⁸ This would address skilled-labour shortages and problems associated with population ageing – for example, by increasing labour supply in both personal and health services. The macroeconomic impact would be fairly small, since net migration rates start from a low base. Note that many studies of the impact of migration on destination countries focus on developed countries.

¹⁹ For example, migrants can provide low-cost childcare and encourage mothers to go back to work.

that the overall net fiscal impact of immigration is actually positive, albeit small (Vargas-Silva, 2013).

1.3 The political economy of international migration

Receiving countries

Residents in receiving countries tend to oppose immigration, particularly low-skilled immigration. Some of the reasons for this resistance have been articulated above. Even if the evidence suggests that the negative impacts of migration on destination countries' labour markets tend to be relatively small, unskilled workers fear that greater immigration will increase competition, thus leading to lower wages and possibly unemployment. Although these arguments are not too dissimilar from those applying to the liberalization of trade and capital (meaning there will be asymmetric impacts across different groups), migration flows remain significantly more protected than the other two. There are also concerns about the potential burden that migrants place on public services. In addition, public attitudes concerning non-economic issues related to migration can be fuelled by nationalism and concerns regarding the impact of migration on social cohesion. Some authors have also linked those attitudes to fears of expansion of the terrorist threat and security concerns (OECD, 2011). However, Mayda and Facchini (2006) conducted a study of public opinion and found that economic considerations weigh more heavily in public attitudes towards migration.

Public opinion has an important influence on immigration policy. A recent survey shows that over half of respondents in the United Kingdom and Italy think there are "too many" immigrants (59 per cent and 53 per cent, respectively) – see Clemens (2011).²⁰ This figure is lower for other developed countries: 37 per cent in the United States, 33 per cent in France, 27 per cent in Germany and the Netherlands, and 17 per cent in Canada.

As a result, politicians are often reluctant to be seen as being soft on migration issues. Arguably, advocating for greater labour mobility for unskilled workers can be particularly challenging for left-of-centre politicians, since this position may alienate some of their core constituencies (Green, 2012). Moreover, campaigning organizations and development practitioners (including international non-governmental organizations – NGOs), aware of the public mood, tend to stay away from the issue. Domestic NGOs often engage in the protection of migrants' rights rather than in linking migration and development.

²⁰ A more recent study found that about 75 per cent of the population in the United Kingdom favours reducing migration (Blinder, 2012).

In relation to the influence of public opinion on migration policy, many authors have identified shortcomings in the communication of migration issues by the media, politicians and advocacy groups (IOM, 2011; OECD, 2011). While the costs of migration are sometimes overplayed, the economic benefits backed up by the economic literature are rarely well articulated.

There is a more general bias towards development in situ among development practitioners, prioritizing development of places rather than people (Pritchett, 2006; Green, 2012). This often overlooks mobility as another tool for poverty reduction. Furthermore, some development agencies are overly focused on aid, and are avoiding other big issues that go beyond traditional aid debates. The latter is also often challenging, as it involves joining up policies from different government departments (Barder, 2012).

Source countries

The bias against labour mobility is not exclusively applicable to politicians and development practitioners in destination countries. According to a United Nations assessment, both developed and developing countries show similar trends in their views and policies on emigration. In 2001, over 70 per cent of countries in the sample thought their level of emigration was satisfactory, and one country in five had policies that sought to lower emigration. Furthermore, only 6 per cent of sampled countries in the less developed countries grouping stated that they aimed to raise emigration (UN DESA, 2002).

This is explained by the fact that governments often have concerns over brain drain and longer-term national economic development, despite some evidence that the benefits of emigration can outweigh the costs – as set out in Section 1.2. Some would argue that remittances could be an incentive to encourage outward migration, while migration provides work and skills that can be valuable in the medium term. Nonetheless, not many countries – with the exception of some of those taking part in the Colombo Process²¹ – have an active emigration programme or integrate migration in their national development policies.

In short, as Barder (2012) rightly points out, there is no one to speak up for people disadvantaged by current immigration rules. Politicians and campaigners

²¹ In response to calls from several Asian countries, the Ministerial Consultation for Countries of Origin in Asia was held in 2003 in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The 10 initial participating States – Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam – made recommendations for the effective management of overseas employment programmes and agreed to have a series of follow-up meetings. Since then, member States of the so-called Colombo Process have met in Manila, Bali and Dhaka in 2004, 2005 and 2011, respectively, to review and monitor the implementation of previous recommendations and identify areas of future action.

in both destination and source countries have reasons to overlook migration as a development tool. Bearing this in mind, the next section takes a closer look at existing immigration policies at international, regional, bilateral and unilateral levels and revisits the politics of migration to understand what could break the current impasse.

1.4 Policies and proposals

Lack of coordination at international level

Most existing agreements granting labour market access are of bilateral or regional nature, with very few initiatives at the global level (Neumayer, 2006). In fact, with the exception of Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), most global initiatives focus on the protection of migrants' rights, the collection of data, research, policy dissemination, technical assistance and training, and discussions and promotion of migration-related development initiatives.

The lack of a significant multilateral agreement seeking to lower barriers to migration can be attributed to the fact that countries are unlikely to cede national control over such a sensitive issue (with the European Union's internal market being an exception). Moreover, countries seem unwilling to negotiate access in a multilateral forum, which could require extending privileges to a wide range of members and undermine other bilateral or regional efforts (which would be the case within the GATS Mode 4).

It is therefore useful to review some of the existing organizations and rules shaping migration policy at the global level. The oldest global organization focusing on migration is the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which has existed under different names since 1951. It was created to help migrants – initially mainly refugees displaced by the Second World War – by identifying resettlement countries and arranging transport. Today, IOM carries out a wide range of activities, including research, policy dissemination, technical assistance and promotion of migration-related programmes that maximize migration's benefits.²²

The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration are the two main multilateral frameworks dealing with migrants' rights. The former was adopted by the United Nations in 1990.²³ Unfortunately, its

²² Similarly, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had its origins in dealing with the consequences of the Second World War, including displacements and resettlements.

²³ Its origin dates back to the 1970s when the United Nations Economic and Social Council raised concerns about discriminatory treatment of migrant workers in host countries (Basnett, 2013).

effectiveness is constrained by the fact that only about a quarter of Member States have ratified it – many of them source countries. The ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration includes 15 non-binding principles, such as decent work, effective management of labour migration, protection of migrant workers, and migration and development (ILO, 2006). However, its non-binding nature restricts its influence (Basnett, 2013).

In 2003, the United Nations set up the Global Commission on International Migration with a mandate to place international migration on the global agenda, analyse gaps in current policy approaches to migration and examine interlinkages with other areas. In 2006, the United Nations launched the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, “a state-led process aimed at building effective partnerships to leverage the impact of international migration on development” (OECD, 2011). Although no formal mechanisms for cooperation emerged from this dialogue, it did encourage further discussion that gave rise to the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), which brings together origin, transit and destination countries to discuss best policy practice. In addition, the Global Migration Group (GMG) was launched in 2006 to encourage inter-agency cooperation in the field of migration (e.g. among the ILO, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNHCR, among others) and also contributes to the GFMD. There have been calls to strengthen the GFMD, particularly to raise the level of officials involved and to encourage participation from other ministries (not just interior ministers but also those charged with employment and economic development portfolios).

To date, the only multilateral forum dealing with labour market access issues is the aforementioned GATS Mode 4. Through specific commitments, Member States of the World Trade Organization (WTO) can allow foreign workers to provide services in specific sectors. However, commitments made by WTO Member States under Mode 4 have been limited to “intra-corporate transferees” and focused on high-skilled service workers, which is unlikely to benefit developing countries significantly, given their comparative advantage on unskilled labour (Basnett, 2013). Owing to the political sensitivities surrounding foreign workers, it is quite unlikely that there will be much progress in expanding and deepening the scope of Mode 4.

In sum, while a number of organizations and frameworks deal with migration at the global level, they are not adequately utilized and implemented, and only one deals with access issues – WTO with GATS Mode 4. Realistically, global-level efforts are likely to be better channelled towards strengthening dialogue and exchanging experiences and practices – which is the aim of the GFMD and GMG. Monitoring and enforcement of labour access opportunities appears more likely to be pursued at the regional, bilateral and national levels.

Regional and bilateral agreements

The European Union is the best-known example of regional integration where the principle of free labour market movements is deeply embedded. In the case of Africa, the Economic Community of West African States and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa have agreed protocols on free movement. MERCOSUR also has agreements to facilitate labour movements across borders, as does the East African Community (EAC) with its Common Market Protocol. Despite embracement in principle, regional blocks (except for the European Union) have kept the movement of people restricted in practice (OECD, 2011).

The EAC Common Market Protocol provides a good example of the restrictions put in place (Basnett, 2013). The Protocol requires workers originating from and moving within the partner States to be granted permits prior to being employed, and citizens of the EAC are extended little exclusive privileges for entry and stay. In addition, the definition of “workers” is limited to highly skilled professionals, while the provisions for mutual recognition of professional qualifications and experiences are not sufficiently outlined.

Overall, progress on regional mobility has been slow. However, there are reasons to think that regional labour mobility could become more important in the future. These include the fluidity of the “receiving/source countries” classification, changing economic conditions and emerging skill shortages/oversupply. Moreover, the introduction of information systems could help raise awareness of skill shortages in specific regions and possibly stimulate specialization, which, in turn, could help encourage regional labour mobility.

Increasing labour mobility can also be negotiated at the bilateral level, for instance through temporary migration agreements. Two well-known examples of such schemes are the Bracero Program, which brought temporary Mexican workers to the United States (1942–1964), and the Gastarbeiter System, which recruited temporary migrants in Germany from a number of Mediterranean countries (1955–1973). The Gulf States, Israel, Singapore, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand also have similar schemes.²⁴

One of the advantages of such agreements is that they are flexible and can therefore be adapted to changing labour market dynamics in receiving countries. They can also be appealing to source countries. The return of temporary workers may

²⁴ New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme, launched in 2007, set out to cover labour shortages in low-wage temporary/seasonal demand in the agricultural sector. World Bank evaluations of the programme show positive effects for source countries: it increased income and consumption of households, allowed households to purchase more durable goods, increased subjective standard of living, and had additional benefits at the community level (Gibson and McKenzie, 2010).

counter concerns associated with brain drain. Moreover, if a migrant's family stays in the country of origin, and migrants leave only temporarily, this could potentially translate into more political support from source countries' constituencies for such agreements. On the negative side, one of the reasons why these agreements went out of fashion is that workers often overstayed – becoming irregular migrants.

There have been proposals calling for more widespread use of bilateral work agreements, which seek to benefit poor people in developing countries while being politically acceptable to voters in developed and emerging economies. Pritchett (2007) emphasizes that, in bilaterally agreed programmes, destination countries need to certify their labour shortages in specific industries, while source countries commit to take responsibility to ensure that temporary workers actually return home. Labour shortages would need to be demonstrated by employers, and could be subject to challenge by trade unions and other interested parties. Sending countries could see their future quotas for the programme decrease if workers failed to return home, although enforcing such controls is quite challenging. Another possibility would be to provide incentives for returning home. Arguably it is far more feasible to negotiate labour access and introduce monitoring and enforcement mechanisms bilaterally – and perhaps regionally – than at the international level.

Unilateral actions: Small change, big impact?

Receiving countries

There have also been a number of proposals suggesting that destination countries' immigration policies could be used much more effectively as a development tool. Small changes in these systems could make a significant difference in terms of poverty reduction (Clemens, 2011).

In the United States context, Orrenius and Zavodny (2010) argue that the United States system gives a low priority to work-based immigration. The authors suggest that provisional work-based visas sponsored by employers would improve the economy's competitiveness. At the same time, provided these were open to migrants from poor countries, it could also have an impact on global poverty reduction.

Box 1.1: Migration as a tool for disaster recovery

Although this chapter is mainly concerned with labour migration, it is important to acknowledge other reasons for migration – such as natural disasters and conflict. Clemens (2011) suggests that migration policy can be used as a tool for disaster recovery. After the earthquake in Haiti, the author explored different options to open the United States labour market to Haitians seeking to migrate.

Currently, those trying to migrate for reasons related to natural disasters do not qualify as refugees, and therefore cannot use that route to enter the United States. Most of the alternatives explored by the authors included minor administrative or legislative changes. In the end, Haiti was added to the list of nationalities that can qualify for temporary low-skilled work, providing another tool for disaster relief.

This type of policy could be replicated in other countries. Furthermore, other alternatives, such as expanding the concept of humanitarian protection to include those fleeing from natural disasters, could also be explored.

Barder (2012) also considers other specific immigration policies that link migration to development policy. For instance, many countries face a shortage of medical workers, particularly nurses and care workers, and this is likely to increase with an ageing population. Hence, destination countries could contribute to the financing of migrants' training. Australia is involved in this type of programme; through the Australia-Pacific Technical College, it funds training for neighbouring countries.

In addition, administrative barriers to migration from developing countries could also be investigated and tackled, such as processes to certify education credentials gained abroad; the lack of such processes can act as a barrier to the movement of labour (UNDP, 2009).

Sending countries

Countries with a large proportion of migrants and a large share of remittances can also put policies in place to maximize the impact of migration on development. For example, since 2005 the Colombo Process countries have taken steps to manage migration outflows more effectively throughout the migration cycle. This entails not only protecting workers from exploitative practices, but also providing pre-departure information, assisting during their stay abroad (including strengthened support in diplomatic missions in key destination countries), and helping with their economic and social reintegration back home. Lowering the costs of migration (including document fees and costs associated with sending remittances back home) and providing financial support (e.g. through welfare funds) are also among

the policies put in place. Furthermore, some countries, such as Mexico, have introduced policies to channel remittances to community-level projects.²⁵

The case of the Philippines is one of the most commonly cited. In the 1970s the country institutionalized labour migration, developing an overseas employment strategy. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration has been the sole government entity with the authority to regulate temporary overseas employment, including the activities of private recruitment agencies, for over 25 years.

Bangladesh and other countries of the Colombo Process are also implementing policies seeking to enhance the developmental impact of migration. This includes improving the regional and bilateral dialogues with destination countries to increase employment opportunities and conditions, better supervision and regulation of recruitment agencies, and the reduction of migration costs for workers.

For example, IOM and the Government of Bangladesh set up a migrant resource centre in the capital in 2008 and set up similar centres in seven other key migrant-sending districts in 2010 and 2011. In addition to providing valuable information, the centres cross-check employment contracts, visa papers and other important documents of migrant workers to further ensure safe migration. Additionally, a market research unit has been set up to promote the skills of Bangladeshi migrants and explore new job markets for Bangladeshi workers (Agunias and Aghazarm, 2012).

Searching for advocates of greater labour mobility

Interest in international migration, and more specifically in the links between migration and development, has been growing. A number of experts in academia, think-tanks and multilateral organizations have put forward convincing economic arguments and evidence on the benefits of increased labour mobility.²⁶

However, the current odds of increasing labour market access to (unskilled) workers in developed and emerging economies, particularly at the international level, seem

²⁵ Under the Mexican 3x1 programme, municipal, state and federal governments triple the amount of money sent by migrant associations. In principle, this is an attractive idea to channel funds to community projects. That said, some evidence suggests that the projects may be subject to political manipulation. Furthermore, given that migration often does not involve the poorest, remittances, and by extension benefits from this programme, are not concentrated in the poorest states (Meseguer and Aparicio, 2009).

²⁶ The UNDP Human Development Report 2009 focused on this issue. In addition, UNDP, the World Bank and the G20 have all argued for a reduction in the costs of transferring money abroad (remittances), so that source countries can increase the benefits from migration.

very low. The slow progress on GATS Mode 4²⁷ and adverse public attitudes towards migration – possibly intensified by the current economic situation²⁸ – provide some support for this scepticism.

However, some of these views may change when confronted with strong external pressures, most notably ageing populations in developed and some emerging economies. This will lead to increasing demand for young workers as economies are likely to face labour shortages and the associated negative economic consequences.

Other factors could, in theory, help change current perceptions of migration, but their influence is likely to be weaker than that coming from demographic pressures. Migration related to natural disasters is becoming more common and is set to intensify in the absence of decisive actions to deal with climate change. Although this is unlikely to change views on migration, it could help to change global politics if there were greater pressure from disaster-prone countries to increase labour mobility.

Lastly, we could also think that the case for greater international labour mobility could be much better articulated by all interested stakeholders – partly by highlighting the existing evidence on the benefits for both receiving and source countries and working more closely with diasporas.

1.5 Implications for a post-2015 framework

Between now and 2015, governments and other stakeholders will actively discuss what might replace the current set of MDGs. However difficult, at some point the debate on a future global development framework will have to discuss issues that go beyond traditional development cooperation and which can have a substantial impact on development outcomes.

Some have argued that development goals and targets should focus on outcomes rather than means (Vandemoortele, 2012), as the latter are context-specific and it would be unconstructive to be overly prescriptive at the global level. Following this logic, migration should not be (explicitly) included in a post-2015 framework, since it is mainly a means to achieve some desirable goals. However, the type of issues

²⁷ It is interesting that many emerging economies' proposals on GATS Mode 4 (temporary labour mobility) provided no concessions with regard to low-skilled workers, suggesting a similar position to that adopted by developed countries. Arguably, proposals can reflect a negotiating strategy rather than a real stance (Green and Winters, 2010).

²⁸ Analysis of trends in labour mobility during previous recessions provides useful lessons. It shows the deceleration of migrant flows to major destination countries, few returning migrants working in countries undergoing economic stress, and a general tightening of immigration regimes (Green and Winters, 2010). There is already evidence of some of these trends in the recent recession.

included in MDG 8 on developing a global partnership for development – aid, debt relief, trade, and knowledge transfer – referred to means rather than ends. These were means that required shared responsibilities between countries, particularly actions from developed economies which would significantly contribute to unlocking development gains. Migration, although not included in the original framework, also falls into this category.

One way of including international migration would be to ensure that its potential role in reducing poverty and fostering human development (an “enabler” in the language used by the United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 United Nations Development Agenda (United Nations, 2012a)) is mentioned, among other factors, in a possible statement to be agreed among world leaders in 2015. While this could be seen as a mere formality, it could significantly contribute to raising awareness and shaping views on the role that migration can play in a post-2015 context.

Implementation of such a statement would be pursued at regional, bilateral and national levels. For example, discussions on mobility and access to labour markets would still be left to bilateral and regional agreements, as these have to be responsive to specific contexts and needs. Furthermore, countries, where relevant, could include migration as part of their national strategies to achieve future development goals in line with ongoing efforts to link migration and development (Åkerman-Börje, 2012).

Alternatively, and perhaps more ambitiously, a new global development agreement could be more explicit about migration and include a series of recommendations (for both receiving and sending countries) as part of partnerships goals – in the spirit of MDG 8. For instance, destination countries – including developed and developing economies – could be encouraged to consider temporary work visa programmes (e.g. expanding labour market access to low-skilled migrants and disaster-affected refugees) and other small changes to their immigration policies which could benefit migrants and destination and source countries. At the same time, source countries could consider migration as another (complementary) policy option in their national development strategies, and thus design policies to maximize its impact on the domestic economy. At the international level, greater efforts could be made to reduce the costs of remittances, as well as to strengthen and consolidate the work of different international organizations on migration and development. Despite considerable political and practical difficulties (not least, data limitations), the possibility of developing some indicators to track progress could be considered, and there are already some efforts in this direction.

Although the political challenges of agreeing on these issues cannot be overestimated, strengthening MDG 8 could chime with some views expressed by

some developing countries. There is a sense that the current MDGs focus on the actions by developing countries, but are much looser about the responsibilities and commitments expected from developed countries. Arguably, MDG 8 was one of the weakest goals in terms of its specificity and design. In fact, progress towards its achievement has stalled, and there are signs of reversals (United Nations, 2012b).

The politics of migration are extremely challenging and there are good reasons to believe that policymakers would rather stay away from the topic in the short term, particularly as the economic crisis continues to unravel. Nonetheless, as demographic changes heighten pressures on countries' labour markets and fiscal budgets, the situation is likely to shift. In the meantime, small changes in the policies of both receiving and source countries, increased engagement with diasporas and a continuous push to link migration and development (including at bilateral and regional levels) could help pave the way towards greater mobility of labour.

Although migration is not the only policy option available to increase global living standards, it can be an important complement to international action on other fronts. Tackling misinformation and inertia surrounding these issues will be a major challenge in the coming years.

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
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Chapter 2



CHAPTER 2

Will a post-2015 development framework acknowledge migration?²⁹

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2.1 Introduction: The road ahead

International development policy is approaching a crossroads. With the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) framework expiring in 2015, the discussion on what could replace or refresh these goals has been gaining momentum. The deliberations on a possible post-2015 global development framework have already brought forward an impressive range of elements to consider, many of which seek to respond to perceived shortcomings of the existing MDGs.

Migration was not included in the original MDG framework, despite the references to it in the Millennium Declaration and clear – and at that time well-known – potential and implications of migration for achieving the MDGs. There have been increasing calls for the next framework to go beyond the partial human development focus of the MDGs towards inclusive and sustainable development. To support such a holistic vision on global development, the means of implementation should go beyond official development assistance and involve a broader set of instruments and development enablers. Adding to the challenge is the fact that a shorter period is available to develop the new framework compared with the time frame used when the MDGs were developed. Furthermore, the process is more demanding, given the desired link with discussions on the Sustainable Development Goals that were committed to during the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (European Union, 2013; United Nations, 2012a, 2012b; Brandi, 2012; Jones, 2012).

²⁹ This chapter is based on a shorter blog version: “Can we afford to ignore migration post-2015?” ECDPM Talking Points, 27 July 2012. Available from www.ecdpm-talkingpoints.org/can-we-afford-to-ignore-migration-post-2015/.

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This chapter first presents how international migration is fundamentally linked to development and the reasons why mobility, especially opportunities and conditions for international labour migrants, should be part of a post-2015 global development framework. Subsequently, it will explore the question of how migration could feature in such a framework and will touch upon key opportunities in the negotiation process for doing so.

2.2 Potentially larger benefits than those from aid and free trade

Globally, there are around 214 million international migrants, the great majority of which crossed borders in search of better employment opportunities. About 70 per cent of total international migrants are born in the South (UN DESA, 2012).³¹ International migration is not restricted to people from low-income countries moving to high-income ones seeking work. South–South migration has been increasing and is believed to be as significant as South–North movements. While a considerable proportion of migration takes place within regions, the majority of migrants from the South have moved beyond their immediate region of birth (UN DESA, 2012). In addition, North–South migration – such as outflows of young Spanish and Portuguese migrants to Angola, Argentina or Mozambique – has increased following the deepening of Europe’s economic crisis, thus reversing the historical trend of labour flows between these countries, at least in the short term (Reuters, 2012; Lipczak, 2012).

International development policy debates frequently fail to acknowledge that migratory choices of individuals to cross borders are often at least as important as large conventional development interventions. International mobility of people is often in itself part of the process of development of migrants themselves and their families. People escape poverty as the very result of moving places (Clemens and Pritchett, 2008). Moreover, international labour migration plays an important role for the development of societies and countries. In Haiti, benefits from remittances sent home by migrants amount to nearly 20 per cent of GDP – more than twice the earnings from the country’s exports. Similarly, the reduction of income poverty in Nepal from 42 per cent to 26 per cent in 15 years was not mainly due to foreign direct investments, or official development assistance, but rather to outward labour migration and remittances (European Union, 2013; Adhikari and Sijapati, 2012).

The report of the High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda notes that the world’s population is expected to increase to

³¹ These numbers, built on data of migrant stock, reflect only part of the picture of mobility as they do not capture short-term movement, such as cross-border trade or seasonal labour migration, equally relevant for development.

8 billion people by 2030. The Panel members also recall that the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms of migrants must be respected, and that migrants make positive economic contributions to both host and sending countries alike. The Panel further estimates that, by 2030, “there could be 30 million more international migrants, remitting an additional \$60 billion to their home countries through low-cost channels” (United Nations, 2013).

Despite this clear potential for contributing to global development, research has shown that these enormous potential global economic gains are far from being fully realized. As Clemens points out, the gains of substantially lowering barriers to labour migration have been estimated to range from 50 per cent to 150 per cent of world GDP (Clemens, 2011). For the citizens of poor countries, this could mean benefits of USD 305 billion a year – about twice as much as combining estimated annual gains from full trade liberalization, foreign aid and debt relief (Pritchett, 2006). Beyond direct effects on poverty reduction, international migration and remittances have had positive effects on education, health and gender equality (European Union, 2013).

In countries of destination, labour migrants often perform important functions, fill skill gaps or labour shortages and thus contribute significantly to the economy. In Thailand, for example, the immigration of lower-skilled labour migrants has contributed to GDP growth. Thai nationals were moreover enabled to find better employment opportunities as immigrants have taken up the so-called “dirty, difficult and dangerous” jobs (Martin, 2007). In most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries “immigrants have made an important contribution to employment growth during the past decade” (OECD, 2009:12).

Yet, one cannot ignore that international migration may also entail negative implications that need to be taken seriously and that often require further policy actions to minimize them. Beyond the possible negative effects of brain drain and lost labour, recent research has looked at the complex social and psychological implications and effects on well-being. New social phenomena may be associated with high levels of emigration. In Nepal for example, the predominance of male labour emigration has been affiliated with an increase in cases of divorce and elopement (European Union, 2013). Other studies observe some negative effects on the psychological well-being of children because of the outward migration of their parents (Graham and Jordan, 2011).³²

The social and economic impact of immigration in destination countries in the South and North thus shows a nuanced and strongly context-dependent picture.

³² For a study of Romanian migrants in Italy and Spain which describes detailed cases of such psychological effects, see Balcanu (2008).

While many empirical studies observe an economic net benefit for countries of destination, these benefits may not be equally distributed and some particular groups in society may be disadvantaged in the short term (European Union, 2013). In addition, some concerns have been raised about negative socioeconomic effects, including the deterioration of social cohesion, xenophobic tendencies and strains on the capacity of receiving developing countries to provide additional services to immigrants (such as health care) or to put in place integration policies.

Such negative effects do not go unnoticed in receiving countries and take a prominent role in domestic political debates. In April 2013, the interior ministers of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom sent a letter to the European Commission demanding stronger measures against so-called “revolving door migrants” from Bulgaria and Romania who were accused of abusing these countries’ welfare systems. While such problems need to be addressed, a larger issue is that many receiving countries experience polarized debates around socioeconomic and sociocultural problems which misrepresent both the opportunities and challenges of labour migration.

Arguing for the benefits of further liberalizing labour migration in such a climate, when also faced with growing levels of unemployment and social inequality, indeed represents a formidable political challenge, as shown by the social unrest in Stockholm in May 2013. As the development gains of international migration are arguably enormous and labour migration mostly constitutes choices individuals make, the negative effects of international migration should not be countered by introducing restrictions that further “securitize” migration policy. The best policy response should rather be to take emerging phenomena, such as children with migrant parents, into account and design policies to respond to them adequately to minimize negative effects.

2.3 Looking ahead: The implications of trends beyond 2015

There is good reason to assume that pressures on worldwide labour migration flows will increase in the future. Demographic developments in future decades will be characterized by growing labour forces in developing countries (increasing from 2.4 billion to 3.6 billion in 2040). This may result in rising unemployment within these countries and contribute to widening gaps in economic opportunities available to populations of richer and poorer countries. The result will be a growing demand for access to labour markets in countries with better opportunities (Koser, 2010).

Parallel to the growth of the labour force in some developing countries, a growing number of emerging and developed countries are experiencing population ageing

and declining workforces. Countries that are currently poor but on a development path may, in the future, compete for labour with today's richer countries. China, for example, is soon likely to aspire to attract international labour migrants against the background of its ageing and declining workforce while its economy is growing (Bruni, 2011). In OECD countries, the positive role of migration in maintaining the size of the labour force is expected to become more important in the future, especially in the European Union (EU) where many Member States have ageing populations and labour-intensive public health and social security systems (OECD, 2012). Moreover, climate change and the disruption of livelihoods dependent on ecosystems will pressure workers to search for employment abroad and will thus be another driver of migration in future decades (Foresight, 2011). This is why migration as a development issue is not only relevant in discussions on a post-2015 framework, but also in the ongoing negotiations on the Sustainable Development Goals.

2.4 The role of migration in a post-2015 agenda

Although in terms of substance the case for including migration in a post-2015 framework is strong, it is less clear how this could be done in a meaningful way. The likelihood of migration being reflected in this framework depends on the course of the overall discussions on the post-2015 agenda; whether a new agenda will focus on poverty eradication or a broader vision of inclusive and sustainable development; and whether it will apply to all countries or focus mainly on the poorest. One should not, however, regress to a passive mode by waiting to see whether migration could be “accommodated”, as key stakeholders specializing in migration policy and practice can play a strong role in determining the outcome of the overall direction and vision of the framework.

The upcoming High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, organized by the United Nations General Assembly to take place on 3 and 4 October 2013, represents such an opportunity. Referring to this, the European Commissioner for Development recently stated: “migration should be recognised as a driver of inclusive economic, social and environmental development and, as such, included as a priority in the post-2015 development agenda.”³³ Depending on the direction chosen, three complementary options can be identified as to how this could be envisaged and implemented.

A first option is to have a stand-alone goal related to migration with single targets and indicators. This would certainly give prominence to the contribution of migration

³³ Quoted from a press release issued by the European Commission on 22 May 2013 – Making migration a driver for development. Available from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-450_en.htm.

to poverty reduction and development. In the language of the United Nations, such a goal could be about “enhancing the benefits of international migration for migrants and countries alike and its important links to development, while reducing its negative implications” (United Nations, 2012a). This is still a broad formulation and adequate targets and indicators would need to be identified. While one could imagine having targets, such as reducing the costs of migration, admitting a quota of international migrants or ratifying the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (adopted in 1990, ratified by 46 countries as of 2012) and the International Labour Organization Conventions concerning migrant workers (Conventions Nos. 97 and 143), it is less clear how exactly the achievement of such migration targets as ends in themselves relates to the improvement of the developmental impact of migration. Measuring this link would require further measurement evaluation and monitoring and makes the task overly complex.³⁴ Moreover, the post-2015 agenda would become overloaded if it had too many other stand-alone goals, which would compromise the clarity and focus of the framework – clarity and focus have been the main strengths of the MDGs.

A second option would be to reflect separate (sub-)objectives for migrants and migrant populations under thematic development goals and targets, such as health, gender, education or others. This seems a feasible option in the context of addressing inequalities that were not given attention in the MDGs. Focusing on vulnerable groups, such as migrants, and measuring their progress with regard to certain goals would be a step in the right direction to reduce inequalities. Yet, while perhaps improving the situation of migrants in certain areas, such a link would neglect many aspects of the interrelation between migration and development that could be positively harnessed for development.

The United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 United Nations Development Agenda has proposed a third option, which is to view migration and fair rules of migration governance as key enablers for development. Such an option views international migration as a cross-cutting issue relevant for several aspects of development and requires the mainstreaming of migration at various levels – locally, nationally and globally. In concrete terms, this means that, when focusing on achieving a certain goal, the potential contribution of international migration, as well as the possible constraint posed by mobility, would be taken into account when designing policy strategies. Such an approach is appropriate when considering that international migration is relevant for a wide range of development factors (United Nations, 2012b) and that its developmental impact much depends on the context.

³⁴ The ACP Observatory on Migration has summarized indicators related to the impact of migration on human development and vice versa and provides a good overview of what could be measured (see Melde, 2012). With regard to measuring the impact of policies, see also Koser (2012).

However, this approach also may “awaystream” international migration if there are no clear goals and targets designed to monitor progress of such a commitment. Furthermore, as for other mainstreaming goals, the institutional mechanisms for such an approach would need to be in place, as this requires the capacity to coordinate between various units, ministries and different dossiers. This holds not only at the national level, but also for the United Nations family, where the Global Migration Group – an effort to bring various United Nations agencies together to coherently work on migration and development – has not fully achieved the level of coordination necessary for effective mainstreaming (see Newland, 2010; Betts, 2010).

A combination of the three options presented here – namely, having a specific goal, making other goals migration-sensitive and mainstreaming migration – would provide for a compelling fourth option: an MDG 8-type goal of a global partnership on international migration. In the spirit of going beyond aid, this would include a stepping-up of the policy coherence for development commitments made (e.g. during the 2010 United Nations High-level Plenary Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals) with regard to international migration. Global partnerships could, for example, explore possibilities to better match labour migrants with labour market needs on an international scale (see European Union, 2013), conclude new and more predictable labour migration and mobility schemes, push for a rights-based agenda for migrants, implement the “5x5” objective for remittances, link mobility opportunities to disaster risk reduction for vulnerable countries (Murray and Williamson, 2011) and integrate civil society, migrant associations and the private sector in those partnerships. The Global Forum on Migration and Development and the United Nations governance on migration and development issues could be strengthened in this context. The crucial challenge is the degree to which governments are prepared to form global partnerships, what type of partnerships could realistically emerge and, equally important, to ensure that governments will live up to their commitments. After all, MDG 8 on developing a global partnership for development was widely seen as one of the goals on which there has been least progress and even a backsliding (United Nations, 2012c).

2.5 The way forward

Despite the promising references to migration in the report by the United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 United Nations Development Agenda (United Nations, 2012b), improving opportunities and conditions for labour migrants is still, however, far from being at the top of the development agenda (Green, 2012; Barder, 2012). In view of the political sensitivities surrounding international migration, particularly – but not only – among OECD members, policymakers may once again prefer not to explicitly factor it into a new global framework on development. Despite the potential of international migration for development and the reduction

of global inequalities, in the last couple of years, changes in immigration policies of receiving countries, especially in the North – but increasingly in the South – have restricted labour mobility and, at times, the rights enjoyed by migrants. Costs for those willing to migrate remain high and the conditions in which migrant workers live are frequently characterized by hazardous work environments, discrimination and insecurity.

Aware of the difficulties surrounding negotiations on international migration, some argue that it is politically unfeasible and too contentious for international migration to be included under the present circumstances and in view of the tight negotiation framework. The non-inclusion of migration in the current MDGs definitely seems to support this idea, as does the report of the United Nations High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda which, while acknowledging the importance of migration, does not include any objectives or targets on migration among the illustrative goals and targets contained in annexed to their report (United Nations, 2013).

Yet, the question is whether a meaningful development agenda can really ignore issues of such fundamental relevance to development. The development community should keep in mind that the volume of remittances by far exceeds official development assistance flows and that migration is relevant for a wide range of development goals. For politicians in developed countries, it may become increasingly costly to ignore the fact that labour immigrants will be needed in the future to sustain economic activity at current levels. For this reason, migration can be a key component of a truly global framework for post-2015 – possibly including the Sustainable Development Goals. Moreover, even modest changes to countries' immigration policies can have a huge impact on people in poor countries, without bearing substantial political risk at home (Barder, 2012).

An important test of United Nations Member States' appetite for any of the aforementioned options for including migration in a post-2015 agenda will be the upcoming High-level Dialogue in October 2013. In May 2013, the European Commission issued a communication concerning the EU contribution for the High-level Dialogue which aimed to provide the basis for a common position of EU Member States. In addition to this objective, the communication proposed how the EU could broaden the link between migration and development in its own policies and practices. While including a strong set of proposals for the High-level Dialogue and taking into account its own policies and migration realities, the Commission discusses its own policies by mostly concentrating on its domestic workforce and migrants already living in Europe. The need to facilitate legal migration is acknowledged; however, by referring to existing legal frameworks, the importance of high-skilled over low-skilled migration is implicitly stressed. This contrasts with frequent references to the need to encourage migration between low- and middle-

income countries. The Communication further highlights the need to support the protection of and access to rights for all migrants, such as access to education and health care, the right to work and the right of free movement for all (European Commission, 2013). The EU does not yet grant this extensive set of rights to all migrants, but it is an important factor for migration to play a positive role for development. A recent comparative study indicates that several EU countries would be in favour of a post-2015 framework that acknowledges migration; however, the position adopted by the EU at the High-level Dialogue will be a strong test case as to how far it is willing to go (ICMPD and ECDPM, 2013).

While the preparations for the post-2015 agenda provide an opportunity to raise awareness and bring attention to the outlined issues, those working towards advancing the migration and development nexus at the international level need to take current realities into account and carefully consider the strategies of engagement in order to “demine” the politically sensitive debates and ensure a greater commitment on the mainstreaming agenda. More research on the political economy of migration is also required, along with development policies and incentive mechanisms, in order to break the current deadlocks through politically acceptable solutions.³⁵

The calls for going beyond aid and focusing on other means to achieve development goals are becoming stronger. International migration does and will continue to have a significant positive impact on poverty reduction and development – an impact that any meaningful post-2015 development framework and true global partnerships should no longer ignore.

³⁵ A recent paper by de la Croix and Docquier (2013) explores such incentive mechanisms. While still a rather theoretical analysis, such research can provide insights for practical translation.

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
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Chapter 3



CHAPTER 3:

Labour migration and development indicators in the post-2015 global development framework

Philip Martin³⁶

3.1 Introduction: MDGs and migration

In 2000, world leaders at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations agreed on eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that have 20 targets measured by 60 indicators. In 2005, world leaders reaffirmed their desire to achieve the MDGs and made commitments to support development institutions, such as the World Bank, and to reduce the debt owed by heavily indebted poor countries so that they could devote more resources to achieving the MDGs. A World Bank (2010) review of progress on the MDGs noted very uneven progress and laid out a plan of action to achieve them by 2015.

The MDGs had their origins in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, which asserts that all individuals have a right to dignity, freedom, equality and a basic standard of living in places that encourage tolerance and solidarity. The MDGs were developed throughout the 1990s in meetings of donors, development institutions, recipients of official development assistance and non-governmental organizations. Their three pillars – namely, raising basic standards of living, increasing social, economic and political rights, and improving infrastructure – were eventually narrowed to goals involving improved nutrition, health care and education to enable individuals to increase their human capabilities. The MDGs are considered the most broadly supported poverty reduction goals ever set by world leaders.

The MDGs are ends rather than means, which helps to explain why there is no target level or indicator of international migration. However, decades of experience show that migration can reduce poverty, and that the very poorest people do not

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migrate as much as those who have some resources (Skeldon, 1997; Taylor and Martin, 2001). As the poorest people gain some resources and hope, more may move. When poor residents leave very poor areas for internal and international destinations they tend to provide remittances to those who remain behind and this may result in the return and investment of money earned outside the area, setting development in motion. Migrants who are successful in destination areas may have their families join them there or return and invest.

Both internal and international migration can reduce poverty. There are four times more internal than international migrants (UNDP, 2009), and almost 55 per cent of the world's people are expected to be living in cities in 2015. Internal migration is largely influenced by national government policies, many of which discourage urbanization.³⁷ Rural poverty can become urban poverty, but opportunities for upward mobility are generally better in cities, making it imperative that governments plan for urbanization.

International migration is shaped largely by the policies of receiving countries that attract migrants (Martin et al., 2006). International migrants can shape development in their areas of origin via the “3Rs”: recruitment, or who migrates; remittances, the funds they send home; and returns, both physical, when migrants go home and inject new ideas and energy into their home countries, or when they settle abroad and forge new trade and other links with their countries of origin, so-called diaspora-led development (Martin, 2010). Each of these channels is examined in greater detail below, but remittances are the focus of most attention because they can be measured and the sums are large.

While the MDGs do not mention international migration, the 3Rs can operate in ways that help countries to achieve them. For example, migration from rural Mexico to the United States of America accelerated rural–urban migration within Mexico, as some of the migrants who returned moved from rural areas to towns and cities; and international migration, in conjunction with the freer trade and investment policy symbolized by the North American Free Trade Agreement, has moved more Mexicans closer to the United States, Mexico's major trading partner (Martin, 1993). Similarly, migration from the Philippines to countries around the world has accelerated rural–urban migration and increased expenditures on children's health and education, since most Filipino migrants are women who leave their children at home (Martin et al., 2004). Migration in Africa also accelerates change, including widespread use of mobile phones to transfer remittances from internal and international migrants to often rural areas of origin. The spread of mobile phones

³⁷ A 2005 United Nations survey found that 75 per cent of governments in developing countries wanted policies to discourage urbanization, meaning that they attempt to slow rural–urban migration. Half of developing country governments expressed a desire to reverse rural–urban migration.

both facilitates remittance transfers and offers information-sharing and education opportunities that can help farmers to obtain better prices and help child and adult learning.

International migration affects residents who move away and those who stay. The 3Rs can operate to help migrants and non-migrants to achieve the poverty reduction MDGs.

3.2 Labour migration and development

Millions of workers in developing countries would like to move to industrial countries where they could earn in one hour what they earn in a day or a week at home. However, should industrial countries open their doors wider to such low-wage workers?

The World Bank and many economists focused on promoting economic development say “yes” to this question, pointing to remittances to argue that migration can reduce poverty and speed up development in migrant countries of origin (Pritchett, 2006; World Bank, 2006). These organizations and authors believe that more migration from lower- to higher-income countries is inevitable, and they call for accelerating the onset of the third wave of globalization – migration – to join with the freer movement of goods (trade) and money (finance) which will act like a rising tide that lifts all boats. While trade and finance are regulated by international organizations, migration is the purview of national governments, which determine who can enter and what foreigners can do inside their borders. Some groups of nations, notably the European Union (EU), have added the free movement of labour to free flows of goods and capital within the now 28-nation group. However, EU Member States continue to determine how many and which non-EU foreigners can enter and stay.

Many efforts are being made to increase international migration and to improve the governance of the migration that occurs. Pritchett (2006) argues that more migration would increase global economic output in the same way that freer trade creates more wealth, namely by allowing countries to specialize. Pritchett begins with five forces that will drive international migration, including persisting economic and demographic inequalities, uneven globalization, and the existence of hard-to-trade services. With globalization reducing barriers to the movement of goods and services, and communications and transportation revolutions lowering the cost of information and travel, Pritchett sees liberalizing labour migration as the last frontier in globalization.

There are calls for a “World Migration Organization” to set rules to pry open more doors in rich countries for migrants from poorer countries (Ghosh, 2000). Meanwhile, since 2006, governments have met each year at the Global Forum on Migration and

Development to discuss ways to improve protections for migrants and to ensure that migration contributes to development in migrant-sending nations (Martin and Abella, 2009).

It is widely agreed that an ideal world would have few barriers to international migration, and very little unwanted migration. Indeed, it is precisely the fact that there will be very little unwanted migration that allows countries to remove barriers to migration. This is why managing international migration in ways that protect migrants and contribute to development in both countries of origin and destination is an increasingly important global challenge. If employers recruit workers in another country who would otherwise be unemployed, if these guest workers send home remittances, and if returning migrants use skills learned abroad to raise productivity at home, migration can speed up development. However, there is no automatic link between migration and development, meaning that policy can make a difference to ensure that the window of opportunity opened by international migration results in faster development.

International migration moves people, or human capital, from one country to another. The 3Rs summarize the impacts that migrants can have on the development of their countries of origin and raise many migration and development questions:

- Recruitment deals with who migrates. Are migrants people who would have been unemployed or underemployed at home, or key employees of business and government whose departure leads to lay-offs and reduced services?
- Remittances to developing countries exceeded USD 1 billion a day in 2012. Can the volume of remittances be increased if more migrants cross borders? How can the cost of transferring small sums between countries be reduced further? Once remittances arrive, are they spent to improve the education and health of children in migrant families or do they fuel competition for fixed assets, as when land or dowry prices rise?
- Returns refer to migrants who come back to their countries of origin. Do returning migrants bring back new technologies and ideas and stay, do they circulate between home and abroad, or do they return to rest and retire?

The 3Rs can have varying impacts on migrant-sending communities and countries, which is one reason why the link between migration and development is often described as uncertain or unsettled (Skeldon, 2008 and 1997; Papademetriou and Martin, 1991). Economically motivated migration can set in motion virtuous circles, as when young workers who would have been unemployed at home find jobs abroad, send home remittances that reduce poverty and are invested to accelerate economic and job growth, and return with new skills and technologies that lead to

new industries and jobs. The result is a convergence in economic conditions and opportunities between sending and receiving areas, as predicted by the factor price equalization theorem.³⁸

The alternative vicious circle of more migration and slower development, and thus even more migration, can unfold if employed nurses, teachers or engineers are recruited for overseas jobs, so that the quality and accessibility in health and schooling declines in migrant-sending areas or factories lay off workers for lack of key managers. In the vicious circle, migrants abroad do not send home significant remittances, or send home remittances that fuel inflation rather than create new jobs. Migrants abroad do not return, or return only to rest and retire, so that there is only a limited transfer of new ideas, energies and entrepreneurial abilities. If the vicious circle unfolds, more migration can slow development and increase the pressure for out-migration.

Recruitment

Migration is not random: young people are most likely to move across borders because they are the least “invested” in jobs and careers at home and have the longest period in which to recoup their “investment in migration” abroad. However, even among young people, exactly who migrates is heavily shaped by the recruitment efforts of employers and recruiters in destination areas, recruiting agents and governments in sending areas, and networks that link them. For example, if employers need IT professionals and nurses, networks are likely to evolve to train computer specialists and nurses and help them to move abroad. Alternatively, if foreign employers recruit domestic helpers and farm workers, networks will evolve to move low-skilled migrants across borders.

The recruitment of migrants has been concentrated at the top and bottom of the education ladder, namely that those with college educations and low-skilled migrants. The overseas recruitment of well-educated professional workers is generally carried out openly, as employers advertise and brokers or agents recruit nurses, IT specialists and teachers to fill foreign jobs. The result can be virtuous, if outmigration in one period creates more jobs in the next, or vicious, if outmigration now increases migration in the next period.

³⁸ The factor price equalization theorem assumes that there are two countries, C1 and C2, with two goods, G1 and G2, produced by two inputs, capital and labour (Mundell, 1957). If G1 is capital intensive and G2 is labour intensive, and the price of capital relative to labour, R/W , is lower in C1 than in C2, C1 is the capital-intensive country and C-2 is the labour-intensive country. Countries export primarily commodities that require intensive use of the relatively cheaper factor, so that C1 should export mostly G1 to C2, while C2 exports G2 to C1, narrowing the costs of capital and labour in the two trading countries. With wage differences narrowing, there is less economic incentive to migrate from the lower- to the higher-wage country, that is, trade is a substitute for migration.

The Indian IT story is an example of a virtuous circle. India had only 7,000 IT specialists in the mid-1980s, according to the Indian software association NASSCOM, but multinationals recognized their skills and recruited Indian IT specialists for operations outside India. Brokers soon emerged to recruit and deploy Indian IT workers to fill foreign jobs. Some Indians returned with contracts to provide computer services to the firms that had employed them abroad, and the Government of India, at the behest of the then-nascent IT outsourcing industry, reduced barriers to imports of computers, upgraded the communications infrastructure, and allowed the State-supported Indian Institutes of Technology to set quality benchmarks for IT education.

Employing Indians in India to carry out computer work for clients abroad had important spillover effects in India. The growing outsourcing industry supported efforts to improve India's electricity and telecommunications infrastructure, promoted merit-based selection systems in higher education and employment, and improved the quality of IT services in India as Indians were offered some of the same world-class services offered to clients abroad. The virtuous circle was completed with a sharp jump in enrolment in science and engineering schools, making India a leading provider of IT specialists and services (Heeks, 1996).

By contrast, the recruitment of African doctors and nurses by hospitals in former colonial powers is often alleged to have set in motion a vicious circle of poorer health care. Many African countries retained colonial-era education systems, so that doctors and nurses today are trained to colonial-power standards. Financially strained health-care systems in Africa often find it difficult to lure doctors and nurses to poorer rural areas, so medical graduates who received government support for their education are often required to serve a year or two in underserved rural areas before being granted medical licences. The result is often a bad experience that prompts many newly licensed health-care professionals to emigrate.

Health care is a peculiar sector, with governments strongly influencing the demand for health-care professionals via the building of hospitals and charges for patients and drugs and influencing the supply of health-care workers by subsidizing the training of medical professionals and setting their salaries. Some African countries – including Ghana, Liberia and Mozambique – have lost half or more of the doctors and nurses who trained there to other countries (Clemens and Pettersson, 2008). However, government efforts to limit the emigration of health-care professionals may not be the proper response to an inadequate wage in underserved rural areas. Barriers to outmigration interfere with personal rights and may be evaded. Furthermore, they may aim for the wrong target, since the number of trained nurses not employed in nursing exceeds estimates of nursing shortages in many African countries.

In 2010, the World Health Organization established the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel to regulate the recruitment of health-care workers. The WHO Code calls for countries to meet their health personnel needs with their own human resources and to assist countries facing critical health worker shortages to improve and support their health workforce (Connell, 2010; WHO, 2010).

Jamaica is a commonwealth country that has one of the world's highest rates of outmigration of professionals. Three quarters of Jamaican university graduates have emigrated, and "migration fever" is reportedly very common among university students who assume that they will have higher wages and better working conditions abroad. In 2001, the Jamaican Minister of Foreign Trade called for bilateral and multilateral arrangements with countries like the United Kingdom and the United States, whereby these countries would pay the Government of Jamaica at least part of the training costs when recruiting people who had trained in Jamaica. To help fill the gap in the health sector, Jamaica has replaced some of its emigrant health-care workers with Cubans.

In contrast to countries that would like compensation from receiving countries for their professionals who emigrate, the Government of the Philippines works to open new markets for its health-care workers abroad. There are several key differences between the Philippines and other countries, including the fact that nursing education in the Philippines is often financed privately, so that individuals, rather than the government, invest in education for foreign labour markets. Some 6,500 to 7,000 nurses graduate from Filipino nursing schools each year, and many plan to go abroad for better pay, more professional opportunities and because of ties to relatives abroad. In 2002, the Philippine Nurses Association estimated that 150,885 Filipino nurses were abroad, and noted that experienced nurses with specialty training were most in demand overseas. Pay for Filipino nurses abroad was reported to be USD 3,000 to USD 4,000 a month in 2003, compared with USD 170 a month in urban areas and USD 75 to USD 95 a month in rural areas of the Philippines. Since it is easier to go abroad as a nurse, some Filipino doctors, who earn USD 300 to USD 800 a month, are reportedly retraining as nurses so they can emigrate. Private recruiters compete with each other to match Filipino nurses with foreign jobs on wages and working conditions abroad as well as prospects for becoming an immigrant who can settle abroad. For example, one agency promises Filipino nurses that their US hospital employers will sponsor them for immigrant visas.

The Government of the Philippines professes little concern about Filipino nurse emigration. In 2002, the then-Labour Secretary, Patricia Santo Tomas, said that nurses are "the new growth area for overseas employment", and that Filipinas have a comparative advantage because of their caregiving skills and English. She said: "We won't lose nurses. The older ones, those in their mid-40s, are not likely to

leave. Besides, the student population reacts to markets quickly. Enrolment is high. We won't lose nurses."³⁹

Instead of health-care professionals emigrating, some developing countries are attracting foreign patients to private hospitals that provide high-quality care at lower-than-home-country prices. Health tourism brings patients to health-care workers rather than moving health-care workers across borders to patients (Connell, 2006). As reported in *The Financial Express* on 11 January 2004, India created a task force to "assess the opportunities for promoting India as a health destination and recommend specific types of health facilities which can be made available for this purpose." The Government of Malaysia calls health tourism a growth industry and has supported its expansion. It was reported that about 60 per cent of foreigners who seek treatment in Malaysia are from Indonesia. Furthermore, in October 2003, the Health Ministry set fees for three packages priced between RM 450 and RM 1,150 and recommended floor and ceiling prices for 18 procedures (*Business Times*, 4 February 2004).

Remittances

According to the World Bank (2012), remittances sent to developing countries, the portion of migrant incomes sent home, were USD 381 billion in 2011 and USD 406 billion in 2012 – over USD 1 billion a day. Remittances are projected to continue to increase to reach USD 534 billion by 2015.

Remittances sent to developing countries have risen with the number of migrants and surpassed official development assistance in the mid-1990s. Unlike foreign direct investment and private capital flows, remittances were stable during the 2008–2009 recession, while foreign direct investment and private capital flows to developing countries fell sharply (Sirkeci et al., 2012).

Remittances have two major components: worker remittances, the wages and salaries sent home by migrants who are abroad for 12 months or more; and compensation of employees (called labour income until 1995), the wages and benefits of migrants abroad for less than 12 months.⁴⁰ Many countries do not know how long the migrants who remit funds have been abroad, so most analyses combine worker remittances and compensation of employees when studying remittances and their effects. For example, Mexico reports most money inflows under worker

³⁹ Quoted in *Migration News*, Southeast Asia, 9(6), June 2002. Available from http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=2650_0_3_0.

⁴⁰ A third item, not generally included in discussions of remittances, are migrant transfers, which is the net worth of migrants who move from one country to another. For example, if a person with stock migrates from one country to another, the value of the stock owned moves from one country to another in international accounts.

remittances, while the Philippines reports most under compensation of employees. The volume of remittances depends on the number of migrants, their earnings abroad and their willingness to remit.

A handful of developing countries receive most remittances. In 2012, India received USD 70 billion, China USD 66 billion, the Philippines and Mexico USD 24 billion each, and Nigeria, USD 21 billion. Egypt ranked sixth, receiving USD 16 billion, followed by Bangladesh and Pakistan with USD 14 billion each (World Bank, 2012). Remittances are the largest share of the economy in a diverse group of countries, including: former Soviet Union countries whose industries collapsed, such as Tajikistan and the Republic of Moldova; island countries such as Tonga and Samoa; and Central American countries with large diasporas in the United States, including Honduras and El Salvador.

Studies demonstrate convincingly that the best way to maximize the volume of remittances is to have an appropriate exchange rate and economic policies that promise growth (Ratha, 2003). Since the terrorist attacks that took place in the United States on 11 September 2001, many governments have tried to shift remittances from informal to formal channels, namely via regulated financial institutions such as banks. Migrants have demonstrated a willingness to transfer money via formal channels, especially if it is easy and cheap to do so, but this usually requires banking outlets in migrant communities at home and abroad and competition to lower transfer costs.

The cost of sending small sums across borders can be 10 per cent of the amount transferred; so, it could cost as much as USD 20 to send USD 200. The G8 and G20 countries have pledged to cooperate to reduce remittance costs, and their 5x5 programme aims to reduce remittance costs by 5 per cent within five years. However, remittance costs are still considered too high, averaging 7.5 per cent in 2012 in the 20 largest bilateral remittance corridors (World Bank, 2012).

The United States–Mexico remittance market is unregulated, in the sense that Mexicans in the United States decide on their own how and how much to remit. Several Asian countries, by contrast, have tried to specify both the amount of remittances migrants must send and the form in which they are remitted. For example, many migrants of the Republic of Korea in the Middle East in the late 1970s were considered employees of their national construction company for which they worked in the Republic of Korea and abroad. Most of their wages were paid in their native currency to their families back home, while they received only a small stipend in local currency. The Republic of Korea no longer sends workers abroad. However, some Chinese and Vietnamese who work abroad remain employees of Chinese and Vietnamese firms. Most of their wages are paid to their families or bank account in the home currency. The Philippines attempted to specify how much

should be remitted in the 1980s, but abandoned this forced remittance policy after protests from migrants.

Forced remittance programmes are unpopular with migrants. Migrants from Jamaica, Barbados, Saint Lucia and Dominica have been sent to US farm employers since 1943 under the auspices of the British West Indies Central Labour Organization, which charged migrants 5 per cent of what they earned for liaison and other services. The Organization required US employers of Jamaican migrants to deposit 20 per cent of each worker's earnings in a Jamaican savings bank. Returned migrants complained that they had difficulty accessing these savings in Jamaica, and received them with no interest, prompting the bank to begin paying interest.

Similarly, between 1942 and 1946, Mexican *braceros* (seasonal agricultural labourers allowed into the United States) had 10 per cent of their earnings sent from US employers directly to the Bank of Mexico. Many of the wartime *braceros* say they never had these forced savings returned to them in Mexico, and the Government of Mexico says it has no records of what happened to the money. Suits were filed in the United States against Wells Fargo Bank, the US bank that transmitted the funds to Mexico. In 2005, without admitting it lost the 10 per cent of *bracero* wages withheld by employers and sent via banks to Mexico, the Government of Mexico agreed to pay USD 3,500 in compensation to *braceros* living in Mexico. However, only 49,000 of the 212,000 Mexican applicants could provide the required documentation to receive payments (Rural Migration News, 2009).

Remittances can reduce poverty and improve the lives of recipients. Most remittances are used for consumption, helping to explain their stability⁴¹ even as exchange rates and investment outlooks change. The presidents of many countries, including Mexico and the Philippines, acknowledge the important contributions made by remittances to financial stability and development. Mexico has the much-touted 3x1 programme, matching each dollar donated by migrants abroad for government-approved infrastructure projects in migrant areas of origin with another dollar from the federal, state, and local governments (Orozco and Rouse, 2007).

The spending of remittances can generate jobs. Most studies suggest that each USD 1 in remittances generates a USD 2 to USD 3 increase in GDP, as recipients buy goods or invest in housing, education or health care, improving the lives of non-migrants via the multiplier effects of remittance spending (Taylor and Martin, 2001). The departure of men and women in the prime of their working lives initially reduces output in migrant-sending agricultural areas, but the arrival of remittances

⁴¹ Automatic stabilizers in developed countries, such as unemployment insurance, help to stabilize the flow of remittances to developing countries that have the same economic cycles as the countries in which their migrants work.

can lead to adjustments that maintain or even increase farm output. For example, families who lose workers to migration can shift from growing crops to raising less labour-intensive livestock and rent their cropland to other farmers.

In addition to remittances, migrants abroad can steer foreign direct investment to their countries of origin and persuade their foreign employers to buy products from their countries of origin. Having migrants abroad increases travel and tourism between countries, as well as trade in ethnic foods and other home-country items. Migrants abroad may undertake many other activities, including organizing themselves to provide funds for political parties and candidates. Many of these activities are informally organized, making it difficult to ascertain their volume and impacts.

Returns

The third element in the migration and development equation is returns. There is no automatic relationship to ensure that more migration will generate faster development. In the virtuous circle linking migration and development, returning migrants provide the energy, ideas and entrepreneurial vigour to start or expand businesses at home or go to work and, with the skills acquired abroad, raise productivity at home. Migrants are generally drawn from the ranks of the risk-takers at home and, if their new capital is combined with risk-taking behaviour upon their return, the result can be a new push for economic development.

On the other hand, if migrants settle abroad and cut ties to their countries or origin, remittances may decline and migrant human capital may be “lost” to the country of origin. If migrants return only to rest and retire, they may have limited development impacts. Lastly, migrants could circulate between sending and receiving areas, and their back-and-forth circulation can contribute to economic growth in both countries.

Most cases of migration contributing to development involve regions that experienced rapid development, making it hard to isolate the contribution of returned migrants. Taiwan Province of China provides an example of this. The government invested most of its educational resources in primary and secondary education in the 1970s, so those seeking higher education often went abroad for advanced study, and over 90 per cent of those who earned PhDs remained overseas despite rapid economic growth back home.⁴² During the 1980s, before the end of martial law, some Taiwanese abroad began to return, while others maintained

⁴² These students were highly motivated to pursue advanced studies. Before they could go abroad, they had to complete two years of military service and obtain private or overseas financing.

“homes” in North America and spent so much time commuting that they were referred to as “astronauts”.

Inspired by Silicon Valley, the Hsinchu Science and Industrial Park was created in 1980 in Taiwan Province of China. Financial incentives were available to high-tech businesses that located in Hsinchu, including subsidized Western-style housing (Luo and Wang, 2002), and Hsinchu was soon a major success, employing over 100,000 workers in 300 companies with sales of USD 28 billion by 2000. About 40 per cent of Hsinchu’s companies were headed by returned overseas migrants in 2000, and 10 per cent of the 4,100 returned migrants employed in the park had PhD degrees.

This experience suggests that investing heavily in the type of education appropriate to the stage of economic development, and tapping into the “brain reserve overseas” when the country’s economy demands more brainpower, can be a successful development strategy. Then-Chinese leader, Premier Zhao Ziyang, referred to Chinese abroad as “stored brainpower overseas”, and encouraged Chinese cities to offer financial subsidies to attract them home, prompting the creation of “Returning Student Entrepreneur Buildings.”⁴³ More Chinese professionals are returning to take advantage of opportunities in China.

The poorest countries pose the largest challenge to encouraging returns. The International Organization for Migration operates a return-of-talent programme for professional Africans abroad who sign two-year contracts to work in the public sector of their country of origin, and the United Nations Development Programme has a similar programme, Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals, which subsidizes the return of teachers and researchers. Many of the professionals involved in such return-of-talent programmes have an immigrant or long-term secure status abroad and remain in their country of origin only a year or two. Richard Black, from the University of Sussex, called subsidized return-of-talent programmes “expensive failures”, since they do not result in the “investment that [return] should bring” (as quoted in Beattie, 2002), although this conclusion was softened to “there is much uncertainty about the impacts of migration and return on development” (Ammassari and Black, 2001:40).

Even if migrants do not return, they could contribute to development in their countries of origin in other ways. Many analysts point to the potential of “circular migration” to speed up development, or diaspora-led development that involves especially skilled migrants promoting trade links with and investments in their countries of origin. Migrant-sending governments can maintain links to their citizens abroad by permitting or allowing dual nationality or dual citizenship. Bhagwati

⁴³ Shanghai reportedly has 30,000 returned professionals, 90 per cent with MSc or PhD degrees earned abroad, who are employed or starting businesses (Kaufman, 2003; Tempest, 2002).

(2003) imagines “a diaspora model [of development], which integrates past and present citizens into a web of rights and obligations in the extended community defined with the home country as the centre.” Bhagwati is well-known for urging migrant-receiving countries to share some of the taxes levied on the incomes of migrants with migrant countries of origin.

Migrants abroad can also send home “political” remittances, such as ideas that help to speed up development by breaking down gender and other stereotypes that limit the education of girls or restrict women in the workplace (Levitt, 1998). Migration exposes people to new opportunities as well as new ideas. Levitt and other researchers focus on how migrants moving from poorer to richer countries transmit ideas that increase the emphasis in their countries on the importance of hard work, education, and savings and investment.

There are also limitations to diaspora-led development. There are many proposals but few concrete examples of migrants and diasporas formally advising or intervening in the governments of their countries of origin to speed up development. Some Mexicans who migrated to the United States were later elected to office in Mexico, but their plans to speed up development were not always well received.⁴⁴ Similarly, diasporas may support and fund one side in civil wars and conflicts, as in Sri Lanka, thereby prolonging them (Orjuela, 2008). Government fears that the diaspora could favour one side in an internal dispute or conflict is one reason why some governments are reluctant to engage their diasporas.

3.3 Global migration patterns

The number of international migrants, persons outside their country of birth for a year or more, doubled between 1980 and 2010, from 103 million to 214 million. However, the share of the world’s people who were international migrants has remained at about 3 per cent over the past half century despite factors that might have been expected to increase migration, including persisting demographic and economic inequalities between countries at a time when globalization is making it easier to learn about and seize opportunities abroad and reducing the cost of travel.

Migration systems in Europe, North America and Asia are being shaped and reshaped by globalization and competition. If a house is a metaphor for a country, migrants can enter via the front door as settlers, via side doors as temporary visitors

⁴⁴ For example, Andres Bermudez, California’s so-called “Tomato King”, was elected mayor of his 60,000-resident hometown, Jerez, in the state of Zacatecas. He first won election in 2001, but that victory was set aside because he had not lived in the town for 12 months. The residency requirement was reduced to six months and he was hailed as a binational symbol when he was elected mayor in 2004. He served as mayor for two years before making a failed bid for Mexico’s federal congress (Quinones, 2009).

and workers, and via the back door as unauthorized or irregular residents. Most countries have welcome-the-skilled, rotate-the-low-skilled, and reduce-irregular-migration policies, although few, except Singapore, make these policies explicit.

It is difficult to manage migration, and there are gaps between migration policy goals and outcomes in all countries that attract migrants. These gaps have prompted some to speculate that borders are “beyond control”, meaning that governments must accept limits on their capacities to regulate who crosses their borders and what non-citizens do inside their borders. Others argue that sovereign nations must increase their investments in migration control systems to deter irregular migrants and enforce the rules governing temporary worker programmes. Lastly, some urge governments to develop selective immigration systems that open doors wider to foreign talent to fuel knowledge-based economies.

Governments can manage migration to achieve openness, selection and control goals, but it is often very hard to achieve consensus on the nature of the goals. Unlike war and crime, where the goal is to minimize these activities, managing migration is more akin to macroeconomic policymaking that aims to minimize sometimes competing goods, such as low inflation and low unemployment. Choosing between such competing goods is often difficult, and most countries have political parties that give higher priority to one of these competing goals, thus explaining why there are likely to be continuing debates over the goals of managing migration and goal–outcome gaps in achieving them.

The United Nations defines an international migrant as a person outside his or her country of birth or citizenship for a year or more. This definition is inclusive, embracing persons born outside the country who are considered to be citizens of a country when they arrive, as with ethnic Germans arriving in Germany, settler immigrants, temporary foreign workers and students, and irregular or unauthorized foreigners. In a world of about 200 sovereign nation States, there were 214 million migrants in 2010, about 3.1 per cent of the world’s 7 billion people.

Most people never cross a national border. Those who do, usually move to nearby countries, as from Turkey to Germany or Mexico to the United States. The largest flow of migrants, 74 million or 34 per cent, moved from one developing country to another, as from the Philippines to Saudi Arabia or Nicaragua to Costa Rica. The second largest flow, 73 million or 34 per cent, moved from developing to industrial or developed countries, which include most of Europe, North America, Australia, Japan and New Zealand. Some 55 million people, or 26 per cent of international migrants, moved from one industrial country to another, as from Canada to the United States. Lastly, 13 million people, or 6 per cent of migrants, moved from industrial to developing countries, as with Japanese who work or retire in Thailand.

About 60 per cent of the world's migrants are in industrial countries, making migrants about 10 per cent of the 1.2 billion residents in industrial countries. The countries with the most international migrants include the United States, with 43 million migrants in 2010; the Russian Federation, 12 million; Germany, 11 million; and Saudi Arabia, Canada and France, about 7 million each. These six countries included 87 million migrants, or 40 per cent of the global total.

Countries with the highest share of migrants in their populations were Gulf oil exporters such as Qatar, where over 85 per cent of residents were migrants, and the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, with 70 per cent of their population being migrants. The countries with the lowest share of migrants in their population include China, Cuba, Indonesia, Peru and Viet Nam, where less than one tenth of 1 per cent of residents were born outside the country.

International migration is the exception, not the rule. The number one form of migration control is inertia – most people do not want to move away from family and friends. Second, governments have significant capacity to regulate migration, which they do, with passports, visas and border and interior controls. One item considered by many established governments when deciding whether to recognize a new entity that declares itself a nation State is whether it is able to regulate who crosses and remains within its borders.

International migration is likely to increase for reasons that range from persisting demographic and economic inequalities to revolutions in communications and transportation which increase mobility. There are also more borders to cross. There were 193 generally recognized nation States in 2000, whereas in 1990 there were fewer than 50 (Lemert, 2005). Each nation State distinguishes between citizens and foreigners, has border controls to inspect those seeking entry, and determines what foreigners can do while inside the country, whether they are tourists, students, guest workers or immigrants.

The first step to make migration a manageable challenge is to understand how globalization in a world of persisting differences encourages more migration. Most people do not want to cross national borders and, even though the number of migrants is at an all-time high, international migrants are only 3 per cent of the world's resident. Furthermore, economic growth can turn emigration nations into destinations for migrants, as has been the case with Ireland, Italy and the Republic of Korea. The challenge is to manage migration in ways that reduce the differences that encourage people to cross borders over time.

3.4 Post-2015 migration and development indicators

Melde (2012) divides the impacts of migration on human development into eight broad areas, ranging from economic to governance dimensions. Her major recommendation is to conduct household surveys to assess the impacts of migration on family well-being and a variety of other development indicators.

The economic indicators focus on individuals and households, and household surveys are suggested as the major source of data to measure the economic impacts of migration, including changes in income and the stability of income. Broader economic impacts of migration can be measured via central bank data on remittances, regional economic indicators, and macroeconomic indicators of GDP and income growth and inequality. Labour market impacts on migration can be measured in wages, employment and unemployment via labour force and household surveys, although current labour force surveys would likely have to be modified to obtain data on the migration background of respondents.

Many of the other items that migration may affect, from fertility to years of education to health status, require repeated household surveys to measure accurately. Birth records generate fertility data, but may not indicate whether the mother is in a household with migrants or influenced by migration. Similarly, if overall education and health-care indicators are improving, household survey data must be combined with other data to determine the extent to which any observed differences between migrant and non-migrant households are due to migration.

Household surveys are also necessary to understand how migration directly affects the role of women, gender roles and family structures. As with education and health care, it may be difficult to separate changes in women's roles due to migration from broader changes affecting the roles of women in both migrant and non-migrant households.

Governance indicators, from perceptions of human rights to confidence in the home society, can be obtained from household surveys, opinion polls and interviews. Environmental indicators that measure awareness of environmental issues after migration to richer countries, as well as changes in behaviour after returning from abroad, can be measured via household survey data and measures of environmental quality. The impacts of returned migrants or diaspora visits can be measured with household surveys, but it may be difficult to assess accurately how information from abroad affects behaviour in the households of families, relatives and others.

Recruitment issues

Recruitment, the process of matching workers with jobs, often involves large fees. The result can be that migrants with an especially low level of skills are vulnerable abroad and may be less able to learn skills and send home remittances. There is no easy way to measure recruitment costs, in part because international norms and national laws establish standards – for example, establishing that workers should not pay any recruitment fees or should pay a maximum fee equivalent to one month's foreign earnings – that are routinely violated (Martin, 2012).

Job matching involves costs that often increase with geographical and cultural distance. Recruitment or job-matching costs can be expressed as a share of earnings, such as the rule-of-thumb that the recruitment costs of an executive are equivalent to 6 to 12 months of his or her salary, and rise as skill levels fall.

Low-skill workers generally pay a higher share of their foreign earnings in recruitment costs than high-skill workers, and many have to borrow money to obtain contracts to work abroad, so that they leave for foreign jobs in debt and more vulnerable.

One indicator of recruitment costs is who is in the recruitment business. Many migrant-sending countries require recruiters to be citizens who obtain licences from government agencies after a variety of checks, including recommendations from current recruiters. Few multinationals move low-skilled workers across borders, with the limited exception of some activities in free-movement zones, such as the EU. If multinational temporary work firms moved low-skilled workers across borders, their presence would suggest fewer side payments and make it much easier to track recruitment costs. Furthermore, the formalization involved with multinational recruiters would likely standardize costs and open the door to lower-cost loans based on valid contracts, with repayment possible via deductions from foreign-earned wages.

The recruitment industry after 2015 will likely be similar to the industry today. Recruitment cost indicators after 2015 include the number of bilateral or regional agreements that establish maximum fees and any fee schedules announced unilaterally by migrant-sending or receiving countries. In formally announced fee schedules, another indicator is how recruitment costs are apportioned between employers, workers and other parties, including governments. Enforcement experience, which depends on complaints, provides limited evidence on how well recruitment regulations are enforced, since many workers drop complaints if the recruiter sends them abroad.

In addition to who is in the recruitment business, maximum fees, enforcement and the number and stability of recruiters could be a post-2015 migration and

development indicator. The normal government reaction to recruitment abuses is to impose new regulations and to raise penalties for violations. This raises a question: would competition that favours better recruiters with faster processing or lower fees, such as an ABC rating system that rewards recruiters for longevity and no complaints from workers or employers, encourage the expansion of better recruiters? One indicator would be the number of A-rated recruiters, and the share of recruiters who are A-rated.

Simple recruitment-fee rules, such as limiting worker fees to a maximum one-month's foreign earnings for a two-year contract, or 4.2 per cent of what they expect to earn abroad, are easier for workers to understand and governments to enforce. If there were a way to quickly calculate total recruitment fees, as there is with remittance fees, governments could adopt a goal such as reducing recruitment fees by specified amounts over time.

Remittance indicators

There are three macro- or national-level remittance indicators and three micro- or household-level indicators. Improving measurements of them in the post-2015 development framework would provide a more complete picture of the links between migration and development.

The amount of remittances received by developing countries is the headline indicator most often cited as the link between migration and development. Remittances to developing countries first exceeded official development assistance in the mid-1990s, and today exceed official development assistance by a factor of more than three to one. The three common macro-level remittance measures are as follows: (1) the total amount of remittances; (2) remittances compared with other financial flows in terms of amount and stability; and (3) remittances as a share of GDP.

Closely related is the cost of remitting small sums across national borders. The World Bank and multinational money transfer firms can provide data on the cost of transferring a standard amount, say USD 200 or USD 300, between two countries. Remittance costs have been falling, in part because of coordinated government efforts to encourage remittances to be transferred via regulated financial institutions to make it more difficult for terrorists to use informal transfer networks. However, the G8 and G20 pledge to cooperate to reduce remittance costs under the 5x5 programme, by 5 per cent within five years, are unlikely to be met by 2015.

The second macro-level remittance indicator involves the effects of remittances on the exchange rate and trade and investment flows. Remittances usually increase alongside trade and investment flows from the countries where migrants are

employed, but the exchange rate effect of remittances can be negative for export-led development in the country of origin. This occurs when an inflow of remittances raises the exchange rate, making it harder to export goods produced in the migrant-sending country. The Dutch exchange rate rose when exports of natural gas during the 1960s and 1970s increased the inflow of foreign currency, making it more difficult for Dutch manufacturers to sell their now more-expensive goods abroad, such that a rising exchange rate that chokes off exports, and the jobs associated with them, is sometimes called Dutch disease.

The three major micro-level effects of remittances are: (1) their effects on the incomes and spending of the families that receive them; (2) their effects on investment and attitudes toward risk; and (3) their effects on non-migrants, as with the multiplier effect of migrant spending. The effects of remittances on family incomes and spending are documented in household surveys that generally find remittances raise incomes, reduce poverty and increase spending on the education and health of children, especially if women receive and spend remittances or remittances are sent by mothers abroad.

The effects of remittances on investment-related activities in the country of origin can also be measured by household surveys and sometimes in business formation data, especially if migrant investments create registered firms. Remittances that are used to expand landholdings, improve irrigation or make productivity-increasing changes in farm and business practices may show up in agricultural and business surveys, but are more likely to be found in household surveys, which may be the only way to learn about remittance-related investments such as purchases of cars that provide personal transportation and serve as taxis or trucks serving both personal and business goals.

Lastly, the spending of remittances generates multiplier effects in local economies, as when materials are bought and workers hired to build or improve housing. The multiplier from remittance spending is usually found to be between USD 1.80 and USD 2, meaning that every USD 1 in remittance spending increases local economic activity by up to another USD 1 as the money is circulated from buyers to sellers or employers to workers (Taylor and Martin, 2001).

Other effects of migration and remittances may also speed up development. Having migrants abroad may forge banking links that can provide funds to often capital-short economies, as between Spain and Latin America over the past decade, and perhaps from Latin America to Spain today. Remittance flows may be accompanied by more trade if transaction costs are lowered by denser economic linkages between two countries.

Return indicators

Most migrant workers eventually return to their countries of origin, either because they want to return or because their work permit ends. The three major return questions relate to how many migrants return, what they do upon return, and the effects of those who do not return – the diaspora – on development in the country of origin.

The first question relates to how many migrants return, and how returns vary by country of destination. The number of migrants returning can be determined at ports of entry, and information from a sample or from all returning migrants can distinguish those who were employed in seasonal or year-round jobs abroad and other characteristics. For development purposes, it is important to know who returns and why; what share of those returning achieved savings targets abroad; and how many are returning because they must, but hope to go abroad again. Some of this information can be gained from surveys of returning migrants at ports of entry, but some may be more easily obtained via household surveys.

The second major return question concerns what migrants do after returning. Some go to work for wages, but many others are self-employed. Surveys of returning migrants conducted at ports of entry can obtain information on the intentions of returning migrants, but household surveys of returned migrants may be required to obtain detailed data. In some cases, labour force surveys or business registration forms can be modified to collect information on workers and entrepreneurs who were employed abroad.

The final question relates to migrants who do not return. Information on circulating migrants can be obtained at ports of entry, and economic and other data can report the density of trade and travel and other links between migrant-origin and -destination countries. However, it is often difficult to distinguish the effects of the diaspora from other influences on trade and travel between countries.

3.5 Conclusions and next steps

About 3 per cent of the world's 7 billion people are international migrants, persons outside their country of birth for a year or more. Most people become international migrants for economic reasons, as they seek opportunities to achieve higher earnings. Persisting demographic and economic inequalities at a time when globalization is making it easier to learn about and seize opportunities abroad and to access cheaper travel will lead to more international migration, prompting fears that migration may get beyond the control of governments.

Migration can promote development in migrant countries of origin, promoting the achievement of the eight Millennium Development Goals. Migration is not mentioned in the Goals because it is a means to achieve development goals, rather than a goal itself; however, the 3Rs that link international labour migration and development – namely, recruitment, remittances and returns – can be an important means to promote opportunities for individuals and national development.

By focusing on migration's potential to speed up development, migration can contribute to human development by reducing hunger and child mortality and achieving gender equality and environmental sustainability.

Indicators that demonstrate how international labour migration contributes to human and social development can be grouped into three broad categories. Recruitment indicators include how many migrant workers go abroad and their characteristics and recruitment fees and other costs, as well as how these expenses are shared between employers, migrants and others. One simple indicator is who moves migrant workers across borders. The presence of multinational temporary work agencies among recruiters could lower recruitment costs and make them far more transparent.

Remittances are the most widely cited indicator of migration's contribution to development. Remittances to developing countries have risen rapidly, topping USD 400 billion in 2012, or more than three times official development assistance. Coordinated efforts to reduce the cost of transferring small sums across borders, and to ensure that remittances flow through regulated financial institutions, demonstrate that migrant-sending and -receiving countries can cooperate to increase the benefits of migration.

Returns are the third link between migration and development. Identifying who returns, and what they do after return, helps to determine whether migration provides an extra spark that speeds up development or offers a temporary respite from poverty. Those who leave a country do not have to return in order to have a development impact, especially if their governments forge links with diasporas abroad.

The migration ideal is a world with few barriers to migration. This ideal would be reached sooner if the migration that is occurring now were to speed up development in migrant-sending areas, so that the push factors contributing to unwanted migration are diminished. Migration is a process to be managed, not a problem to solve, and migration that speeds up development makes managing migration a far easier challenge.

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
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Chapter 4



CHAPTER 4

Health in the post-2015 development agenda: The importance of migrants' health for sustainable and equitable development

Davide Mosca, Barbara Rijks and Caroline Schultz⁴⁵

4.1 Introduction

With less than 1,000 days left until the target date of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the world looks at both the achievements and the unfinished elements of this global development agenda. While the MDGs have been instrumental in reducing the burden of HIV, tuberculosis and malaria and have helped to reduce maternal and child deaths, thus enabling millions of people to survive and escape the poverty trap, not all goals will be met by 2015. In addition, several new challenges and global trends have become manifest since the formulation of the MDGs and need to be captured in the successor development framework. These include the severe impact of non-communicable diseases, often brought about by unhealthy lifestyles, the growing recognition of the social determinants of ill-health, and lastly global mobility and diversity in societies as a new feature of a globalized world.

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Box 4.1: Migration today and in the future

There are approximately 215 million international migrants today. If current rates of international migration continue, the number could reach 405 million by 2050. Adding the around 740 million internal migrants to the picture, all in all, there are about 1 billion people on the move today, a seventh of the currently 7 billion people on the planet. The volume of modern migration is indicative of the global relevance of the health of people moving across and within borders.

Migrant labour has become crucial to the economies of many countries worldwide, for instance in the mining sector, the construction industry, the health-care sector and domestic work. Facilitated by faster and more affordable transport and communication technologies, as well as transnational migrant networks, modern migration is increasingly global, multidirectional and dynamic, often involving temporary and circular movements.

With increasing inequalities within and between countries across the globe, the concepts of human rights and equitable access to resources and opportunities have acquired new meaning and are now widely deemed crucial for sustainable development. The debate on the world we want post-2015 is now in its second year, and the vast majority of stakeholders agree that the post-2015 development framework on health should take a holistic, people-centred approach based on principles of health equity and the right to health for all. Yet, migrants – particularly women and children, the undocumented, the lower-skilled, and those marginalized by dominating anti-migrant sentiments in societies – face significant difficulties in seeing their right to health recognized and addressed.

This chapter explores why and how migration-related health challenges should be integrated in the post-2015 development framework, and argues that migration and its surrounding conditions are key social determinants of health for migrants and their home and host communities. Based on this and the fact that health is a prerequisite for development, it argues that the post-2015 development agenda on health has to explicitly include reference to migration-related determinants of health. These concepts are supported by the outcomes of the Global Thematic Consultation on Health in the Post-2015 Development Agenda (see box 4.2). Post-2015 health goals need to include migrants regardless of their legal status: specific indicators should be adopted to monitor migrants' access to health care and the health outcomes of migrants.

Box 4.2: Highlights from the Global Thematic Consultation on Health in the Post-2015 Development Agenda

“Health is central to sustainable development: health is a beneficiary of development, a contributor to development, and a key indicator of what people-centred, rights-based, inclusive, and equitable development seeks to achieve.”

“Health is important as an end in itself and as an integral part of human well-being, which includes material, psychological, social, cultural, educational, work, environmental, political, and security dimensions. These dimensions of well-being are interrelated and interdependent.”

“The guiding principles for the new development agenda should include human rights, equity, gender equality, accountability, and sustainability. The most disadvantaged, marginalized, stigmatized, and hard-to-reach populations in all countries should be prioritized.”

Source: WHO et al. (2013).

4.2 Migration as a social determinant of health for migrants

In order for migration to become an enabler of development, the underlying social determinants of migrants' health need to be addressed and migrants' access to health promotion, prevention and care services needs to be ensured, regardless of their legal status and other barriers.

Many of the 1 billion migrants worldwide are especially vulnerable to exploitation, discrimination, marginalization, stigmatization and abuse and therefore to the risk of adverse physical, mental and psychosocial health outcomes. Faced by increasingly restrictive immigration policies and border control measures of destination countries, migrants often have to turn to dangerous modes of travel and pay exorbitant fees to unscrupulous smugglers, who not infrequently turn into human traffickers. While many of the increasingly segmented labour markets worldwide depend heavily on migrant workers, migrants are the ones who have to take on difficult, dangerous and demeaning jobs, and are often the first to lose them in times of economic downturn. In addition, migrants frequently fall through the cracks of social protection, including health care – in most societies, irregular migrants and their children do not have access to health insurance, health care and other basic services. Even if legislation allows them to access health services, migrants generally choose to avoid seeing a doctor due to fear of detention, deportation, xenophobic and discriminatory attitudes, or linguistic, cultural and gender factors.

In short, the conditions in which migrants travel, live and work often carry exceptional risks for their physical, mental and social well-being. Therefore, the migration process itself can be considered a social determinant of health. Social determinants of health are the conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age, and are responsible for avoidable differences in health status within and between countries.⁴⁶ As is the case for many marginalized populations, the health of migrants is to a large extent determined by factors outside the health sector.

The World Health Assembly resolution on the health of migrants recognizes “that health outcomes can be influenced by the multiple dimensions of migration.” (WHA, 2008). Risks to migrants’ health vary according to migrants’ individual characteristics (gender, age, disability, etc.), their education level and, most notably, their legal status. Irregular migrants, in particular, face higher risks of exploitation and marginalization, including lack of access to health services. “Migrants ... are often subjected to stigmatization, gross violations of human rights, and inhuman treatment [and] are among the most frequently discriminated against when it comes to accessing general health care.” (WHO et al., 2013).

Box 4.3: Global Consultation on Migrant Health (Madrid, 2010)

In 2008, the World Health Assembly endorsed a resolution on the health of migrants (WHA 61.17) that spelled out actions for governments to enhance the health of migrants and promote bilateral and multilateral collaboration. In response to the resolution, the World Health Organization (WHO), IOM and the Ministry of Health and Social Policy of the Government of Spain organized the Global Consultation on Migrant Health in 2010. Yet, the resolution on the health of migrants is still far from being fully implemented. Addressing the health of migrants in the post-2015 development framework could help to refocus attention towards implementation of the resolution.

As the factors that determine the health of migrants (and thereby, of wider societies) are shaped largely by policies on immigration, education, housing and social protection/welfare in general, these sectors need to take the health of migrants into account. Therefore, the new development framework on health needs to promote intersectoral cooperation and action to progress towards health equity. It is important to recognize that policies outside the health system need to be adapted (i.e. immigration, labour, housing policies), and that cross-sectoral action and coherence are crucial. Indeed, the achievement of health goals “requires

⁴⁶ These social determinants were identified by the work of the Commission on Social Determinants of Health, the subsequent World Health Assembly resolution 64.14 on reducing health inequities through action on the social determinants of health (WHA, 2009), and the Rio Political Declaration on Social Determinants of Health (WHO, 2011).

policy coherence and shared solutions across multiple sectors: that is, a whole-of-government or ‘health-in-all-policies’ approach” (WHO et al., 2013).

Box 4.4: Children of immigrants left out of health care

Findings of a recent study on low-income families in the United States of America have shown that those with more precarious immigration statuses show the poorest health outcomes, and that families with non-citizen members face barriers, real or perceived, to using ... health-related programmes.

Source: Ziolo-Guest and Kalil (2012).

Box 4.5: Undocumented workers in Canada

Researchers found that undocumented migrant workers in the Greater Toronto Area in Canada constitute a flexible and cheap workforce for Canadian businesses, and that the conditions under which they live and work have severe consequences for their health.

Source: Gastaldo et al. (2012).

4.3 The health of migrants bridges rights, public health and development

There are three key reasons why the post-2015 development framework needs to include a reference to migrant health: (a) migrants have a right to health; (b) including migrants in health systems improves public health outcomes; (c) healthy migrants contribute to positive development outcomes.

Migrants have a right to health

The right to health was first enunciated in the WHO Constitution (WHO, 1946) and later reiterated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25 (1948), as well as in several legally binding international human rights treaties. The right to health is an all-inclusive human right that encompasses equal opportunity for everyone to enjoy the “highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”⁴⁷

⁴⁷ The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), Article 12. The Covenant delineates the steps to be taken by States to achieve the full realization of the right to health, including prevention and treatment of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; and the creation of conditions which would assure medical service and medical attention to all in the event of sickness. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explicitly states that “the Covenant rights apply to everyone including non-nationals, such as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, migrant workers and victims of international trafficking, regardless of legal status and documentation.” (General Comment No. 20, 2009).

It is closely interrelated to and interdependent on other basic rights, such as housing, education, employment, and so on (IOM et al., 2013). Yet, for migrants, the right to health is often not fully realized owing to legal, social, economic, linguistic and cultural barriers. Barriers to migrants' health persist regardless of international and national legal commitments. For example, some countries have cut their subsidies for interpretation and translation services in health-care settings, while others have adopted legislation that limits undocumented migrants' access to health care.

In addition, many States require migrant workers to undergo compulsory pre-departure and post-arrival medical examinations, often including testing for certain conditions such as HIV (ILO and IOM, 2009), tuberculosis (Welshman and Bashford, 2006) and pregnancy (UNDP, 2008), despite commitment by States to enact legislation eliminating all forms of discrimination against persons living with HIV (United Nations, 2011). Frequently paid out-of-pocket by prospective migrants, the medical examinations are often carried out without informed consent, counselling or follow-up care and can result in a halted or disrupted visa process. Some labour agents even force migrant women to take long-term contraception, as reported by Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2007). Women, who comprise a significant percentage of migrant workers, generally face greater health vulnerabilities. According to Human Rights Watch (2005), in cases of pregnancy, women may resort to risky illegal abortion to avoid deportation. Numerous countries deport migrants living with HIV (Pebody, 2010). According to Human Rights Watch (2009a), 30 countries practice measures like automatic detention of migrants and asylum-seekers with treatable infectious diseases, deportation and limitations to travel, work or reside abroad. These practices not only violate international rights instruments, but further aggravate social exclusion of migrants and stigmatization, discouraging migrants from seeking care, delaying or hampering early diagnosis and treatment and the achievement of global health goals, and hence exacerbating the risks of adverse health outcomes of migration.

Box 4.6: Health professionals' attitude as a potential barrier to access

The attitudes and degree of migrant-sensitive training of health workers and other staff working in health facilities are important factors in the likelihood that migrants utilize health services efficiently. For example, in South Africa, several studies found health staff discriminating against migrants, such that migrants routinely reported that they faced delays, refusal or inappropriate charges when they attempted to use the health services.

Source: Human Rights Watch (2009b) and Vearey (2008).

Including migrants in health systems improves public health outcomes

The exclusion of migrants from public health systems is not just a violation of migrants' rights; it is also counterproductive from a public health perspective.

Migrants are an increasingly large part of today's societies. Addressing their health needs should thus be a vital component of any effective public health policy promoting sustainable health outcomes.

For instance, many migrant workers have to return home to seek health care because they do not have access to treatment in the country of destination. This means an additional financial and social burden for migrants, their families and their communities of origin. Therefore, migration, when not managed well, can lead to significant public health challenges. Costs for the community left behind can thus outweigh financial remittances. According to the Stop TB Partnership, "the current cost of the TB epidemic in the South African mining sector [which crucially depends on migrant workers] is estimated at \$886 million per year. However, implementing activities to tackle TB in mines would eliminate these costs and bring about increased productivity, resulting in a total financial benefit of \$783 million per year."⁴⁸

From a public health perspective, guaranteeing migrants' equitable access to health care and health promotion is hence both sound and practical – it is cost-effective and improves public health outcomes. Promoting migrants' use of primary health care and early treatment, and including them in disease-control programmes, will reduce the need for costly emergency care and related high costs for the health system. Addressing the health of migrants caught in crisis and post-conflict situations (e.g. the Libya and Syria crises in 2011/2012) and ensuring continuity of care across borders for migrants and displaced persons is especially relevant to public health. Emergency preparedness plans and responses should ensure migrants' and displaced persons' access to health care and continuity of treatment, as well as access to psychosocial support.

Healthy migrants contribute to positive development outcomes

A third reason for including migrants' health in the post-2015 development framework is that health and development are inextricably linked. Health is a prerequisite for, as well as an outcome of, sustainable development (WHO, 2012). In addition, it is now widely acknowledged that migration also carries a development potential, due to migrants' intellectual, cultural, social and financial capital and their contributions to the social and economic development of their communities of origin and destination. Remittances sent home by migrants to developing countries are equivalent to more than three times the size of official development assistance (World Bank, 2013) and can directly contribute towards poverty reduction. Being and staying healthy is a prerequisite for migrants to work, be productive and contribute to positive development outcomes, for example through sending remittances,

⁴⁸ Full article available on the Stop TB Partnership website: www.scribd.com/doc/112565220/TB-in-South-African-Mines.

sharing knowledge or facilitating trade. The thematic think piece on migration and human mobility, prepared by IOM and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs for the United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 United Nations Development Agenda, argues that “a substantial case can be made for the inclusion of migration as a cross-cutting issue” in the new framework, and calls for the promotion of methods to mainstream migration into development planning (IOM and UN DESA, 2012).

In addition to the health risks migrants face while working and living in hazardous environments, which are often characterized by discrimination and insecurity, direct health costs for migrants remain high. In particular, migrants without a legal status often pay for health care out of their own pockets at a higher price than that paid by nationals. If universal health coverage were to include universal health insurance, it could help to leverage the positive development impacts of migration and ensure that migrants’ use of health services does not expose them and their families to financial hardship. Out-of-pocket payment for health services, short-sighted policies that limit the access of migrants to emergency care, unaffordable health insurance and lack of social protection schemes exacerbate costs for both migrants and societies, as the above-cited example of the South African mining sector shows. In addition, these prevent the full development potential of migration and go against the sound principle of investment in health for social and economic development upon which the health-related Millennium Development Goals were based (Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001).

Box 4.7: Efforts to enhance access to health services for migrants

A number of States are using innovative approaches to address the health of migrants. For example, Sri Lanka and the Philippines put in place insurance schemes for their overseas migrant workers. Thailand offers migrants and their families health services through a compulsory migrant health scheme. Brazil and Portugal are examples of countries that have adopted a policy of equal access to coverage for all migrants irrespective of their legal status. Other initiatives are led by trade unions and employees. For instance, in Argentina, employers contribute a percentage of workers’ salaries towards a special fund that covers social benefits, including health insurance. Only a few cases of portable health-care benefits exist outside of the European Union, such as the Moroccan–German agreement. Although these efforts have their limitations, they are a step forward in recognizing the important contribution of migrants to development and the need to ensure the health of migrants.

Source: Annex 1: Examples of global migrant health responses, which accompanied the Roundtable 2.1 background paper on Reducing the costs of migration and maximizing human development, presented at the fourth meeting of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), held in Mexico in 2010. Available from www.gfmd.org/en/docs/mexico-2010.

4.4 The way forward

The health of migrants needs to explicitly be recognized in the post-2015 development agenda. The importance of healthy migrants for positive migration outcomes should also be put on the agenda of migration forums such as the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, to be held during the Sixty-eighth Session of the United Nations General Assembly in October 2013, which has the overall theme of “Identifying concrete measures to strengthen coherence and cooperation at all levels, with a view to enhancing the benefits of international migration for migrants and countries alike and its important links to development, while reducing its negative implications.” Addressing the health of migrants is indispensable for reaping the benefits and reducing the negative effects of international migration for all stakeholders. Another important venue at which to advance action to improve the health of migrants is the annual Global Forum on Migration and Development. The theme of the current 2013–2014 GFMD chairmanship “Unlocking the potential of migration for inclusive development” opens the door for a more migrant-centred discussion where migrants’ health is recognized as a crucial element of inclusive human development that benefits migrants, their families and host and home communities.

Box 4.8: Further highlights from the Global Thematic Consultation on Health in the Post-2015 Development Agenda

“Equity can be made explicit in all the goals by disaggregating indicators and targets at all levels.”

“The post-2015 health agenda should ... include specific health-related targets as part of other development sector goals.”

“Examples of effective intersectoral action should be shared and widely disseminated so that others can learn from these experiences.”

Source: WHO et al. (2013).

The new post-2015 development framework needs to address the specific needs of these vulnerable and marginalized populations, recognize the impact of migration-related social determinants of health and support a human rights-based approach to health. However, a major obstacle today to effectively measuring the health of migrants globally is the universal lack of standardized data on the issue. The adoption of specific, measureable, achievable, relevant and time-bound indicators on migrant health will assist States and other actors to set targets and monitor progress on improving the health of migrants, and to improve social and economic determinants affecting migrant health. Moreover, universalist approaches promoting, for instance, the concept of “universal health coverage” mostly do not conscientiously include

migrants in the population that is to be “universally covered”. This concerns first and foremost undocumented migrants. For this reason, the post-2015 development framework on health needs to include specific indicators on migrant status.

Box 4.9: Including migrant health in the United Nations post-2015 development agenda

How exactly could the health of migrants be addressed in the post-2015 development framework? One viable option would be for the new development framework to include a combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators that measure progress along four key priority areas outlined in the World Health Assembly resolution 61.17:

1. **Monitoring migrant health:** ensure the standardization and comparability of data on migrant health and support the appropriate aggregation and assembling of migrant health information.
2. **Policy and legal frameworks:** adopt national laws and practices that respect migrants’ right to health, based on international laws and standards; implement national health policies that promote equal access to health services for migrants; extend social protection in health and improve social security for all migrants.
3. **Migrant-sensitive health systems:** ensure that health services are delivered to migrants in a culturally and linguistically appropriate way; enhance the capacity of the health and relevant non-health workforce to address the health issues associated with migration; deliver migrant-inclusive services in a comprehensive, coordinated and financially sustainable fashion.
4. **Partnerships, networks and multi-country frameworks:** ensure cross-border and intersectoral cooperation and collaboration on migrant health.

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
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Chapter 5



CHAPTER 5

Migration as a development enabler: Putting enablers into practice in the post-2015 development agenda

Chris Richter⁴⁹

5.1 Introduction

In its foundational report, *Realizing the Future We Want for All*, the United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 United Nations Development Agenda⁵⁰ lays out its vision for a new framework to pursue poverty eradication and achieve sustainable development once the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) expire in 2015. A key aspect of the proposed framework is the inclusion of a core set of “development enablers”, which are intended to support progress towards four key dimensions of development: inclusive economic development, inclusive social development, environmental sustainability, and peace and security (United Nations, 2012a). Migration, and specifically fair rules to manage migration, is highlighted as one of these enablers.

While the meaning of the term “development enabler” might seem somewhat self-evident, in practical terms it is much less clear how these development enablers can be integrated into the post-2015 agenda, raising a number of important questions. How does migration act as an enabler of development? How can the concept of a development enabler be operationalized? How does it relate to a possible set of development goals, targets and indicators? How can such a concept be measured and evaluated? Apart from identifying issues that are thought to hold an enabling potential for development, *Realizing the Future We Want for All* provides only minimal guidance to help answer these questions. Indeed, the report specifically states that there are no blueprints for the most effective enablers, arguing instead that these questions are best answered on a case-by-case basis (United Nations, 2012a).

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⁵⁰ The Task Team was established by the Secretary-General in January 2012 to coordinate United Nations system preparations for and inputs to the post-2015 development agenda, and to propose a collective vision for the new agenda. It comprises some 60 United Nations agencies and related entities, including IOM.

While that is no doubt true, for migration and development practitioners it presents the additional challenge of having to clearly define and operationalize migration as an enabler of development and to articulate how it should best be incorporated into the post-2015 framework. Fortunately, the international development discourse provides some useful ideas to help frame the enabler concept in a practical sense, and to situate migration squarely as a key element of the new development agenda. There is also a substantial body of evidence and research in the migration and development literature, which can help to identify the multiple and complex links between migration and development and which can clarify some of these important questions.

This chapter discusses some of these issues, outlining how migration is considered an enabler for development and how it might be operationalized in the post-2015 development agenda.

5.2 Defining development enablers

At its simplest, the concept of a development enabler is about recognizing and responding to the systemic issues and global trends that can influence, positively or negatively, sustainable development. It is about ensuring that the effect of those factors produces positive, rather than negative, outcomes and that the barriers to development are reduced, if not completely eliminated. Within development discourse, for example, a great deal of attention has been paid to the need to manage the interdependence of today's globalized world, and to take into account the impacts of globalization in order to make it a positive force for development. This notion has been expressed, explicitly or implicitly, in numerous contributions to the development literature, which is littered with references to globalization and the need to manage its consequences.

One of the clearest examples of this can be found in the document that formed the basis of the MDG framework we have today – the Millennium Declaration. Adopted in the year 2000, the Millennium Declaration is the key document outlining the values and principles on which the MDGs are now based. It recognized that globalization presents both challenges and opportunities for the international community, and that the central challenge is therefore to ensure that it becomes a positive force for all the world's people (United Nations, 2000). Part of the approach for doing so called for creating an environment – both at the national and global levels – “which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty”. In other words, the Declaration called for an enabling environment which would allow progress to be made towards development and which would ease some of the systemic issues that can hinder positive progress.

The need to properly take account of and address the challenges posed by globalization has also received attention in subsequent international texts, such

as the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, which stressed the importance of holistic, collective and coherent partnerships as a means of managing the increasingly globalized and interdependent world economy (United Nations, 2003). The outcome document of the Rio+20 Conference, *The future we want*, also reaffirms the importance of an enabling environment to sustainable development. It notes the continued need for an enabling environment at the national and international levels, as well as continued and strengthened international cooperation in order to “accelerate progress in closing development gaps between developed and developing countries, and to seize and create opportunities to achieve sustainable development through economic growth and diversification, social development and environment protection” (United Nations, 2012b).

More recently, the global discourse on the post-2015 development agenda has focused on the fact that globalization presents both challenges and opportunities, and that managing its impacts is vital to ensuring sustainable progress towards development. *Realizing the Future We Want for All* emphasizes that, because of the highly interdependent and interconnected world, a holistic, global approach is required in order to respond to a changed modern context, and to the new actors and challenges emerging within the international setting (United Nations, 2012a). Importantly, the ongoing debate has highlighted migration, alongside other demographic trends such as population growth, ageing, “youth bulges” and urbanization, as being among the important global trends, challenges and opportunities that must be taken into account in order to make the new development agenda effective.

5.3 Framing migration as a development enabler

Migration fits well within a concept of development enablers which focuses on managing the implications of globalization and increased connectivity. It is itself a truly globalized phenomenon that can have both a positive and negative impact on progress towards sustainable development and towards any internationally agreed set of development goals. While migration is neither categorically a cause of nor a cure for underdevelopment, it is nevertheless an important factor that can influence the way in which development unfolds and the resulting outcomes. Indeed, migration has evolved in ways that will place increasing pressure on societies to manage its implications for development. It has increased in both scale and complexity, has become increasingly multidirectional and short term, and is the result of a diverse set of factors that cannot be addressed by any one country acting alone.

Details about the scale of migration are well known – roughly one out of every seven people on the planet today is on the move, including some 215 million international migrants and 740 million internal migrants (IOM, 2010, 2013; UNDP, 2009). While the proportion of the world’s population who migrate overseas – around 3 per cent

– has remained relatively stable over the past two decades, the absolute numbers of people moving has increased and there are more people on the move today than at any point in history (IOM, 2010, 2013). By its sheer scale alone, migration has become a defining megatrend of the twenty-first century which touches many lives, whether individually or collectively. However, the actual number of people directly affected by migration is much larger than these numbers alone suggest. Many of the people who migrate have family who depend on them in their home countries; whole industries have evolved to facilitate and support the movement of people across the globe; while businesses and national economies alike depend on migrants to fill key labour and skills shortages (see Chapter 6).

Furthermore, migration is becoming an increasingly complex phenomenon, with migratory patterns evolving in ways that create new challenges for migrants and for origin and destination countries alike. Movements involving the permanent settlement of people who have migrated from one place to another are giving way to more malleable and short-term patterns (see Chapter 6). Today, migration is characterized by greater circularity; people move back and forth between countries with increased regularity, and in some cases to multiple destinations. The composition of migrant populations is also evolving in new ways. Migrants today come from a wider range of countries and backgrounds than ever before, while significantly more women are migrating on their own or as the head of households (IOM, 2010). These trends are of particular relevance to host communities, which experience the effects of migration in terms of changes to social structures, identities, attitudes, norms and practices (IOM, 2011). This in turn poses fundamental questions regarding daily social relations and social cohesion.

The increased scale and complexity of migration creates crucial justifications for migration to be incorporated into the post-2015 development agenda and associated sustainable development goals. For instance, goals related to urbanization or to disaster risk reduction would be incomplete without taking into account the implications of rural to urban migration. Policies on financing for sustainable development may miss out on new and innovative forms of funding if they do not consider the scale and impact of migrant remittances. Efforts to reduce inequality and to promote human rights would be insufficient if they did not address migrant experiences of discrimination and exploitation. Mechanisms dealing with labour market gaps and skills shortages would not benefit from the full array of options available without considering skilled and unskilled labour mobility. Strategies relating to climate change and the environment would be inadequate if they did not consider migration, both as a driver and a result of climate and environmental pressures.

Quite aside from the implications migration presents as a global megatrend, the act of migrating can offer substantial social and economic benefits to migrants themselves, and to their countries of origin and destination. In that sense, migration

is not just an enabler of development, but is itself an expression of development. For example, the *Human Development Report 2009* found that migrants who moved from a country with a low human development index to a country with a higher index experienced, on average, a 15-fold increase in income; a doubling in education enrolment rates; and a 16-fold reduction in child mortality (UNDP, 2009). Migrants' private remittances meanwhile – which were estimated to have reached some USD 406 billion in 2012 (World Bank, 2012) – contribute to poverty reduction; higher human capital accumulation; spending on health and education; greater access to information and communication technologies; improved financial sector access, small business investment, job creation and entrepreneurship; and greater household resilience to natural disasters or economic shocks (see Chapter 6; Ratha et al., 2011).

Furthermore, the extent to which migrants integrate into and are welcomed by their host communities is important. What happens to migrants in terms of health, education, employment, social protection and peace and security is central to making migration work for development, not just for the social and economic development of the societies in which they live, but also for their own human development. Migrants who are free from discrimination or exploitation, who have full access to health and education and who are able to participate in decent employment can better contribute to the social and economic development of nations. Above all, they lead full and productive lives, which is surely the overall goal of human development.

5.4 Incorporating migration into the post-2015 development agenda

While migration offers potentially huge gains for migrants, and for origin and destination countries alike, it also presents a number of challenges and can be associated with new inequalities and vulnerabilities, especially when it is poorly governed or occurs under conditions of insecurity. The gains that can be derived from migration are therefore not automatic, and whether or not migration acts as an enabler of development depends on whether the migration process itself is safe, humane and orderly. The potentially positive impact of migration on development, therefore, hinges upon appropriate policies to govern migration in a humane and orderly way and upon the protection of the human rights and well-being of all migrants.

This last point is a particularly important issue to take into account when conceptualizing how migration fits within the broad development agenda, for at least two reasons. First, it highlights the fact that, while migration and migrants can make significant contributions to development, they should not be viewed simply as instruments of development – they are also subjects of development. Second,

it provides some clues as to how the development enabler potential of migration can be operationalized. For example, we know that migration has important links to sustainable development and can create hugely positive benefits. We also know that the extent to which migration creates positive outcomes depends on the migration process itself being safe, humane and orderly. It is also dependent on the extent to which migrant rights are protected and promoted and how well migrants integrate, and are integrated into society. Lastly, we know that, being a globalized phenomenon of such huge scale, migration cannot be managed by countries acting in isolation.

These above-mentioned points lead quite logically to a set of mutually reinforcing (and at times overlapping) policies:

1. Policies to promote and protect migrant rights, including to protect and enforce labour rights; to promote non-discrimination against migrants; and to provide greater access to social services and social safety nets.
2. Policies to ensure that migration is safe, humane and orderly, such as simpler and freer migration programmes and entry requirements; mechanisms to protect migrants during times of crisis, including as a result of environmental disasters; or strategies to combat human trafficking and smuggling.
3. Policies to maximize the positive benefits of migration, such as to support the flow of remittances and their productive use; to encourage and manage circular migration; and to enhance portability of rights.
4. Global partnerships to operationalize policy options 1, 2 and 3 and to manage the global implications of migration, such as through labour mobility agreements; fair recruitment practices; and commitment to and development of international migration norms and standards.

In turn, these policy options can be linked to a set of corresponding goals, targets and indicators that might be incorporated into the post-2015 development agenda so that the enabler potential of migration can be realized. Four particular options are evident, each with its own strengths and weaknesses.

A first option, which does not exclude any of the other three, is to separately highlight migration and other enablers within the broader foundational documents underpinning the new development agenda. For example, some proposals have suggested that enablers like migration could be incorporated through a statement agreed by world leaders (see Chapter 1), possibly much like the Millennium Declaration provided a basis for the MDG framework. However, as experience with the MDGs has already shown, while such an approach would give recognition to these issues as important factors to take into account, without tangible means of operationalizing their development potential, and without clear goals and targets to formally incorporate them, they risk being forgotten once the framework is instituted and efforts to meet its objectives begin in earnest.

Second, migration could be included in the new framework as a stand-alone goal. As with the first option, this would certainly elevate migration as an important contributor to development, bringing it front and centre in the development discourse. However, it is difficult to see how a stand-alone goal would garner sufficient traction among United Nations Member States, particularly in an environment in which many diverse issues are competing for attention and where there is strong consensus on the need for a framework that includes only a small number of clearly defined goals. Furthermore, other political considerations may affect the feasibility of a stand-alone goal being incorporated. Many Member States may see a stand-alone goal as a first step in the creation of a normative international framework to govern migration, an issue that has been particularly sensitive because of the implications for how governments determine their own migration policies, including entry requirements and visa caps. Lastly, there are also some questions about what such a proposal would actually encompass. For instance, while a stand-alone goal could incorporate targets to enhance the benefits of migration in other areas of development, such as health, education or employment, it is not clear why such targets should be included under a migration goal, rather than the other way around. This leads to the third option.

Third, migration could also be included as a cross-cutting issue under other development goals (e.g. targets or indicators concerning migration could be inserted under goals dealing with health, education, employment, human rights, inequality, or the environment) focusing on policies that maximize the positive benefits of migration in these different thematic areas. In addition, migrant rights could be highlighted in any targets dealing with the protection and promotion of rights, or enhancing access to social protections and reducing inequality. Not only are goals on issues such as health, education or employment more likely to be included as elements in their own right, but, given its cross-cutting nature, migration is probably better suited to being implemented across the board rather than as a stand-alone element. This would also better reflect the enabler potential of migration, closely linking it to the key areas in which it has the greatest impact on development.

Fourth, migration could become a possible aspect of a renewed global partnership for development, building on the current MDG 8: Develop a global partnership for development. Of all the options outlined, this is perhaps the strongest avenue through which to include migration in the post-2015 agenda. Indeed, global partnerships have been a particular focus in the post-2015 discourse. For example, both the United Nations Task Team and the High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda have agreed that revitalizing the global partnership under MDG 8 is an important task moving forward, and that migration is an essential element to that (United Nations, 2012a, 2013; High-level Panel of Eminent Persons Secretariat, 2013). A global partnership would be an important means of operationalizing the enabler potential of migration, being a mechanism to address its cross-border implications and broader systemic barriers through bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements. The textbox below outlines some areas in which partnerships might be beneficial.

Box 5.1: Goal: Develop and strengthen global partnerships for development

Target: Create cooperative agreements related to human mobility to enable safe, lawful, less costly migration across or within borders, which ensure the protection of the human rights of migrants and produce positive development outcomes for all stakeholders. Key areas in which to focus migration partnerships:

- Reducing the barriers to migration (such as by opening legal pathways for migration, promoting dual nationality and citizenship)
- Reducing the costs of migration and associated transfers (such as visa, travel documentation and remittance fees and recruitment costs)
- Enhancing the development opportunities for origin and destination countries (establish labour- and skills-matching arrangements and circular mobility agreements, promote diaspora engagement and investment, implement low-skilled/seasonal worker programmes)
- Enhancing the development contributions and opportunities of migrants (establish integration and social cohesion programmes, promote portability of rights and recognition of educational qualifications)
- Promoting and protecting migrant rights and safety (combating discrimination and providing access to appropriate health, education and basic social services, promoting labour rights, combating trafficking and people smuggling)

5.5 Conclusion

The strong link between migration and sustainable development is widely accepted: migration is the world's oldest poverty reduction strategy; it is an indispensable engine for human development; a driver of economic growth; and a source of dynamic and innovative cultures. The scale and complexity of contemporary migration patterns also hold important implications for development. This puts pressure on societies to manage the effects of mass human mobility on development, including in dealing with the changes to social structures, identities, attitudes, norms and practices, as well as the physical and economic pressures associated with urbanization, resources use and public services. For these reasons, migration has been recognized as a vital enabler of development.

The development enabler concept has taken on particular salience in the context of the post-2015 development agenda. The debate has featured discussions on the need to manage the increasingly globalized challenges currently facing humanity and to create an enabling environment in which to pursue development outcomes in a more sustainable manner. What has been less clear in the global discourse is how the enabler concept can be operationalized in practice, and how development enablers like migration can be incorporated into the post-2015 development agenda. This chapter offers a practical way of thinking about these issues and highlights a number of ways in which migration can be integrated. The most important point to note is that the potential of migration to act as a development enabler is contingent on the migration process itself being safe, humane and orderly. Effective policies

are therefore important to helping migration achieve its potential for development, and incorporating migration into the post-2015 development agenda is an essential part of that.

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
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Chapter 6



CHAPTER 6

Developing a global partnership on migration and development in the post-2015 agenda

Sarah Rosengärtner and Lars Johan Lönnback⁵¹

6.1 Introduction

With one out of seven people on the planet being on the move, migration and the networks it creates will be a defining feature of the twenty-first century, affecting the lives of people, communities and countries around the world. Migration is driven by development opportunities, but it also drives development and enables people to lead a better life. Although migration and development are inextricably linked, the current Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) make no reference to human mobility. With less than 1,000 days to the 2015 “finish line” set to achieve the MDGs, a lively and highly participatory discussion on a successor framework – the United Nations post-2015 development agenda – is under way. A first milestone in the process defining the next development agenda was reached at the end of May 2013, when the High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General to lay out a vision for the post-2015 agenda, presented its report, *A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development* (United Nations, 2013a).

The High-level Panel report broadens the scope of the discussion on the United Nations post-2015 development agenda beyond the current MDGs towards an agenda that is reflective of the more comprehensive global consensus of the Millennium Declaration (Karver et al., 2012). At the same time, it confirms the value and strengths of the MDGs by aiming to formulate indicative goals and targets of similar brevity, clarity and measurability. The report does not mention human mobility in any meaningful way, either in its narrative or in the proposed, indicative goals and targets. Sceptics questioning whether migration should be included as

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a development issue may thus conclude that the political economy of migration is just too sensitive and migration too “toxic” an issue to feature in the post-2015 agenda.⁵²

Yet, policies and action taken by countries from across the development spectrum point in another direction. The scale of migration is and will be an increasingly important reality for policymakers in a range of areas, including the economy, labour markets, taxation, social cohesion and integration. The fact that more and more countries are seeking to better harness the benefits of migration, and changing migration patterns, will entrench the need for international policy dialogue and partnerships among countries that increasingly face the same migration-related challenges.

Mobility has been instrumental for human advancement throughout history, in terms of economic, social and cultural development. Migration remains one of the most effective strategies for individuals and families to improve their lives, and it will influence the development trajectory of countries over the lifetime of the next development agenda. Official estimates of international migration mask the fact that mobility, past and present, affects people and societies beyond those who move in profound and transformational ways. An agenda that ignores the opportunities and impacts of migration risks growing out of touch with the reality of global labour markets, increasingly diverse societies and ever-denser transnational networks. If it aims to bring about inclusive globalization, but fails to understand migration dynamics, it will risk exacerbating vulnerabilities, cementing privileges, and squandering talent and resources.

This chapter argues that migration is one of the twenty-first century challenges shaping the new development “narrative” that the post-2015 agenda seeks to embody and articulate. This chapter will:

- a. Reflect on the current development context and foreseeable patterns of human mobility;
- b. Discuss migration as a development “enabler” and why a partnership approach is needed;

⁵² A number of ongoing processes are seeking to frame the next global development agenda. Under the auspices of the United Nations, global, regional and national consultations are being organized to feed into the deliberations. At the same time, United Nations Member States created the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals, following up on the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) held in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012, which is to develop and agree upon a set of sustainable development goals. While it is currently unclear how the two processes will converge, ultimately they must do so. One possible scenario is that the current post-2015 process will formulate the broad framework or narrative for the next development agenda (similar to the Millennium Declaration) including an indication of global priorities, while the Open Working Group will define the goals that are to fulfil the aspirations of the broader narrative.

- c. Suggest migration-related partnership options for the post-2015 development agenda;
- d. Identify ways in which migration and development stakeholders might be able to capitalize on the post-2015 narrative and indicative goals and targets proposed by the High-level Panel;
- e. Propose a set of possible migration-related targets and indicators.

6.2 The evolving migration and development context

The development landscape is currently undergoing significant changes in terms of subject matter and means of implementation, including: (a) a decreased relevance of the dichotomy between developed and developing countries; (b) decreasing levels and relevance of official development assistance; (c) new partnerships with the emergence of South–South cooperation and with influential non-government and private actors; and (d) increasing importance of policy coherence to tackle the interrelated challenges of social and economic development and environmental sustainability.

These kinds of changes and developments are mirrored by transformations in the scale and patterns of human mobility. There are an estimated 215 million international migrants in the world and about 760 million internal migrants. Taken together, at least one in seven people on the planet is on the move. Many of these people have families or others who depend upon them, and many more will have moved at some point in their life; so the actual number of people affected by migration is much larger than the share of current migrants alone would suggest.

Migration is increasingly multidirectional, with South–South migration now at the same level as South–North flows. Furthermore, global demographic imbalances and new poles of growth in emerging economies can be expected to lead to new migration patterns over the coming decades. Movements are already – and will probably remain – predominantly short distance and short term rather than intercontinental and permanent. At the same time, labour markets will increasingly rely on finding necessary skills at all levels in a globalized labour market, as is already apparent in several sectors of the advanced economies.

The migration and development discourse has traditionally framed migration as a problem to be solved by fostering development in countries of origin. Increasingly, however, mobility is recognized as an integral part of development processes which presents important human development opportunities, as well as trade-offs and costs. This shift in perception is reflected in a slow but steady increase in facilitative rather than control-focused policy responses to migration (Black and Sward, 2009). Progress has also been made in terms of international dialogue and cooperation

on migration and development, notably through the first United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development held in 2006, and the ensuing Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) process. Countries of the North and South see their roles as destination versus origin in flux; increasingly they are facing the same challenges when it comes to governing migration.

Migration, therefore, fits well within a universal framing of the post-2015 development agenda as it emerges from the global consultations so far and is captured in the High-level Panel report.⁵³

Box 6.1: Migration within the current development discourse

Contemporary development narrative	Contemporary migration realities
Decreased relevance of the dichotomy between developed and developing countries	All States are countries of origin and destination
Decreasing levels and relevance of official development assistance	Relevance of remittances for GDP of developing countries and household resilience
New partnerships with the emergence of South–South cooperation and with non-government and private actors	Emergence of various forms of international cooperation, e.g. through bilateral agreements and mobility partnerships, regional integration and consultative processes, and the GFMD
Importance of policy coherence to tackle social/economic and environmental sustainability challenges	Lack of integration of migration into development planning at all levels

⁵³ Built on a symmetrical partnership between countries at all levels of development, such an agenda would revolve around universal goals applying to all countries but with differentiated targets to account for differences in development status.

6.3 The post-2015 process: Framing migration as a development enabler

Migration was first introduced into the current post-2015 discussion by the report of the United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 United Nations Development Agenda, *Realizing the Future We Want for All* (United Nations, 2012a), which framed migration as:

- a. A key dimension of global population dynamics;⁵⁴
- b. An enabler for inclusive economic and social development, if well managed;
- c. A possible element of a renewed global partnership for development, building on the current MDG 8.

These three “roles” of migration are mutually reinforcing: The dynamic and complex nature of global mobility patterns and of their interactions with development challenges (including poverty reduction, human rights and human security, governance, climate and environmental changes) suggests that States can neither effectively govern migration nor “unlock” its full human development benefits through internal policies alone; only collaboration between countries and with other stakeholders will be able to achieve this.⁵⁵

Considerable evidence exists to document the development contributions of migration at different levels:

- Migration can be an enabler of individual capabilities and human development by enhancing people’s income, health and education. *The Human Development Report 2009* found that those migrants who moved from countries with a low human development index to a country with a higher index experienced, on average, a 15-fold increase in income; a doubling in education enrolment rate; and a 16-fold reduction in child mortality (UNDP, 2009).⁵⁶ Remittances have been shown to contribute to poverty reduction among families left behind by increasing household incomes and enabling them to invest in housing, health and education. Research suggests that internal remittance flows are probably most

⁵⁴ This was also mentioned in the Rio+20 outcome document (United Nations, 2012b).

⁵⁵ Even in the case of internal mobility, the role of climate-induced environmental changes as drivers of such mobility and the associated challenges of rapid urbanization and, in many cases, enhanced vulnerability to disasters make it an issue for global cooperation.

⁵⁶ The *Human Development Report 2009* also found that the selectivity of migration flows – the tendency for those who move to be better off and better educated in the first place – can explain only a fraction of these gains.

important for poverty reduction, as internal migrants make up three quarters of the world's migrants and their remittances typically go to the rural poor (UNDP, 2009).

- Migration can also enable national development opportunities by supplying countries with needed labour and skills, and by contributing to innovation.⁵⁷ For a number of countries, remittances make up a significant share of GDP, support national income and represent the largest source of foreign currency earnings, allowing countries to pay for critical imports, gain access to capital markets, and pay lower interest rates on sovereign debt.
- Migration has a role to play in helping to manage global risks. Remittances have helped countries and households cope with the global economic crisis and with more frequent environmental shocks. In many regions, migration is already part of adaptation strategies to cope with environmental change, by allowing affected households to diversify their income.

Yet, just as for other so-called “enablers” in the post-2015 discussion, such as trade and the transfer of technologies, the development potential of migration remains elusive without the right policy interventions. For migration to be a development enabler, the migration process itself must be an opportunity for human development: how migrants and their families fare in the migration process – the “quality” of movements – is a key determinant of their human development outcomes and thus of the larger developmental impacts of migration. Concern for the human rights and well-being of migrants cannot be decoupled from the role of migration as a development enabler.

Given that the enabler potential of migration is large – yet cannot be taken for granted since the right policies and effective international coordination and cooperation must be in place – migration would best be addressed as part of the next global partnership for development.

6.4 Integrating migration into the global partnership for development post-2015

The current MDG framework addresses development enablers through MDG 8: Develop a global partnership for development.

⁵⁷ Economic research suggests that foreign nationals living in the United States of America accounted for 25.6 per cent of all patent applications and founded 26 per cent of start-ups, including a majority of Silicon Valley start-ups (Wadhwa, 2013). In addition, an increase in immigrants with higher education diplomas is associated with an increase in patenting (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2008). An expansion of high-skilled visas passed in 1998 increased revenue at affected companies by 15 per cent (Lin, 2011, as quoted in Matthews, 2013).

There are various scenarios of how a commitment to global partnerships might be framed in the post-2015 agenda:

- a. The next development agenda could have one global goal on partnerships for development, similar to the current MDG 8, but equipped with measurable targets and indicators this time;
- b. The agenda could attach a specific partnership to each thematic goal, thereby spelling out more directly the relationship between enablers and goals;
- c. The agenda could formulate a whole set of global partnership goals that would cover key enablers of human development, and which would complement the set of goals that will be focused on final human development ends. This would elevate the status of the enablers, equalling a post-2015 development agenda in two parts.⁵⁸

The High-level Panel report adheres to the first scenario, proposing among 12 goals one distinct partnership goal in line with the current MDG architecture. At the same time, however, the report underlines the need for the partnership goal to directly support and be linked to the other 11 more “substantive” goals that the Panel has put forward. For the time being, neither the narrative nor the set of goals and targets proposed by the High-level Panel includes migration. Yet, the centrality that the High-level Panel attaches to the need for a new global partnership, as well as to sector-specific global partnerships, can serve as an entry point for further advocacy on migration. The United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 United Nations Development Agenda has argued for an expanded number of partnership elements, including migration and human mobility (United Nations, 2013b). This view was also expressed by the High-level Panel meeting in Bali in March 2013, dedicated to the issues of financing for development and global partnerships.⁵⁹

A migration-related partnership could take various forms, reflecting the different sets of challenges and interests associated with different types of migration (regular or irregular; high-skilled or low-skilled; voluntary or forced, etc.). Migration could be recognized as a “priority enabler” with a partnership in its own right; and it could play a role in a number of other thematic partnerships. The following presents a preliminary sketch of what different migration-related global partnership options might look like.

⁵⁸ This kind of two-part agenda has been proposed by the German Development Institute (see Loewe, 2012).

⁵⁹ See meeting communiqué available from www.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Final-Communique-Bali.pdf.

Remittances within an enabling environment for development in the context of “stable, long-term private foreign investment”⁶⁰

Arguably, the least controversial way of enhancing the benefits of migration for migrants, their families, communities and countries of origin and destination alike will be to improve the facilitation of remittances and other forms of diaspora contributions with a view to enhancing migrants’ choices when it comes to sending, saving and investing their money. International migrant remittances to developing countries through official transfers alone amounted to around USD 406 billion in 2012 (World Bank, 2012). It is estimated that lowering the cost of international remittance transactions by five percentage points could lead to gains in the order of USD 16 billion a year.⁶¹ Internal remittances are less well documented, but may hold greater potential to support the poorest, as they typically go to poor households in rural areas (UNDP, 2009).

Remittances are private funds that primarily go to support household expenditures and sometimes community investments. The post-2015 discussion on development financing should steer clear of comparing remittances to official development assistance or suggesting that they could be a replacement. In some cases, migrants and members of the diaspora have contributed to their country of origin’s development as investors and entrepreneurs, creating businesses and jobs where they deem local conditions conducive enough, or through trade, tourism and philanthropy (Agunias and Newland, 2012). A number of existing schemes seek to harness the financial resources of migrants and diasporas for productive purposes, including by extending financial services to migrants and their families and providing migrants and members of the diaspora with investment opportunities, such as through diaspora bonds.⁶² Yet, these kinds of initiatives are likely to succeed only if migrants and diasporas have trust in the institutions and overall economic management and prospects of the country in which they are asked to invest. International partners could play the role of an honest broker and assume a “quality assurance” function. A global partnership on financing for development could thus focus on issues such as:

- Promote opportunities for migrants and diaspora members to securely transfer and save money, and provide them with incentives to invest their

⁶⁰ See United Nations (2013a), Annex I: Illustrative Goals and Targets; Goal 12: Create a global enabling environment and catalyse long-term finance.

⁶¹ See World Bank, Remittance Prices Worldwide, at <http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/> (accessed 31 July 2013).

⁶² “[N]ational diasporas represent a potentially significant source of financing for many developing countries. Multilateral development institutions and national development banks could help to tap these resources for development by facilitating investment in productive activities by members of the diaspora and/or remittance recipients. This could provide a source of small-scale foreign direct investment (FDI), whose developmental benefits would be enhanced (relative to more conventional FDI) by being more deeply rooted in local economies” (UN DESA, 2012:72).

funds to support economic and social development, resilience, post-conflict reconstruction and disaster relief interventions.

Ideally, the next iteration of the global partnership for development, like the other MDGs, will be equipped with measurable indicators. Indicators relating to remittances and diaspora contributions could revolve around the following:

- a. Cost of transferring remittances;
- b. Percentage of remittance flows that move through formal channels and are recorded in national accounts, according to the International Monetary Fund manual, *International Transactions in Remittances: Guide for Compilers and Users*;
- c. Percentage of remittances transferred using new technologies;
- d. Percentage of remittance senders and receivers with access to financial services;
- e. Rates of financial literacy of senders and receivers of remittances;
- f. Number of countries that have issued diaspora bonds and volume of funds invested;
- g. Share of remittances and diaspora contributions going to countries affected by conflict and disaster;
- h. Number of businesses and jobs created with diaspora resources.

Human mobility within a global partnership for development

More predictable regimes for bilateral, intraregional and interregional labour mobility could make an important contribution to poverty reduction and future economic growth, especially in view of global demographic imbalances and the skills crisis projected in the coming decades.⁶³ Yet, in the light of the 15 year time frame of the post-2015 agenda, any global partnership in this area would have to leave the concrete arrangements pertaining to human mobility to be developed at regional, bilateral and national levels. Nonetheless, there could be a global agreement on the overarching objectives and principles that should govern such arrangements and anchor them within the post-2015 development framework.⁶⁴

⁶³ For more information on global skills imbalances, see Dobbs et al. (2012).

⁶⁴ The High-level Panel report, while advocating universally applicable development goals, foresees in-built flexibility to adjust targets to specific national and local contexts, so as to tailor the scope of global-level ambitions to the political, economic and financial realities on the ground (United Nations, 2013a).

Currently, development gains from migration are realized despite the fact that human mobility remains tightly regulated and associated with high costs and long timelines. Research on the effects of lowering costs and barriers to freedom of movement indicates that even relatively small increases in mobility for migrants from developing countries would potentially yield enormous development gains (Clemens, 2011). However, concerns regarding State sovereignty over entries and admissions suggest that a global partnership would be well advised to stay clear of any quantitative commitments regarding human mobility. Instead, the focus should be on the quality of movements by creating cooperative agreements related to human mobility to enable safe, lawful, less costly migration across or within borders and ensuring respect for and the protection of the human rights of migrants. Such an approach would be in line with the way other global interdependencies, such as trade, have been tackled in the current MDG 8 and in the High-level Panel report. Neither calls for increasing trade, but rather for an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system.

A global partnership on human mobility could seek to enhance the poverty eradication effects and human development gains that accrue to migrants and their families by addressing, through dialogue, barriers to mobility which take the form of the high upfront costs involved in migration, including for official documentation, visas and recruitment fees, and long and uncertain timelines; as well as by facilitating the portability of migrants' earned benefits, assets and qualifications. In addition, it should not shy away from addressing the often difficult conditions under which migrants move, work and live, by addressing migrants' human and labour rights in line with the agreed language from the Rio+20 outcome document (United Nations, 2012b: paras. 147, 157).

Building on the proposal by Newland (2013) for a migration-related partnership goal, a global mobility partnership could be framed as:

- Create cooperative agreements related to human mobility to enable safe, lawful, less costly migration across or within borders.

Such a partnership could rely on indicators along the following lines:

- a. Number of national laws and international agreements on the recognition of foreign qualifications and number of foreign qualifications recognized;
- b. Number of labour mobility agreements and number of people moving under those agreements;
- c. Existence of provisions for the protection of migrants' rights under mobility agreements;

- d. Number of agreements concerning the portability of benefits and number of people covered, or volume of funds transferred, under those agreements;
- e. Costs for recruitment, and for obtaining documentation and visas.

Global partnership on health systems

The impacts of labour migration are usually particularly tangible in certain sectors of the economy. Concerns about skilled emigration and “brain drain” have been most pronounced when affecting key social service sectors such as health and education.

The post-2015 agenda can almost certainly be assumed to include a goal on health.⁶⁵ To deliver on such a commitment, the capacities of health systems will be critical. Health systems in many countries will be strained by the demands of ageing societies and by new forms of health risks (such as non-communicable diseases) that are reduced with better standards of living. Health systems also need to adapt to be able to respond to the health profiles and needs of more culturally and ethnically diverse societies (see Chapter 4). In a globally interconnected world, public health will hinge on inclusive and accessible systems geared towards prevention and early intervention, including by extending primary health care, early treatment and disease-control programmes to all, including migrants.

Mobility is already a reality in the global health sector, which employs a large migrant workforce and is seeing an increase in medical tourism, along with the outsourcing of long-term care provision from developed to less developed countries. How the movement of health and care workers (and potentially that of patients) is managed will have a significant impact on the delivery capacity of health systems in countries of origin and destination (Khadria, 2010). Countries of origin have taken a number of domestic measures to mitigate the impacts of health worker emigration, including improvements in remuneration, “bonding” of medical school graduates and reform of education financing so that people seeking training as a means to move abroad rely on private resources rather than public funding. These could be complemented by a global partnership that promotes: (a) the implementation of the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel, which was adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2010; (b) investments in medical skills in both countries of origin and destination (in developing countries of origin, these could be supported through official development assistance or private investments in skills that are particularly useful in-country but less tradable across borders); and (c) investments in alternative technologies for delivering health services, which would allow skills that are in short supply to benefit larger numbers of people (UNDP, 2009:109).

⁶⁵ The High-level Panel report proposes a goal on health, Goal 4: Ensure healthy lives (United Nations, 2013a).

Global partnership on resilience and disaster risk reduction

Although much larger in scale than international migration, internal mobility may not appear to be a pressing global concern warranting the attention of a development partnership. Yet, it is an integral part of the interrelated global challenges of rapid urbanization, climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction. Of further concern in this context is the blurring of lines between voluntary and forced movements, and the implications this may have for the protection of those who move.

In tackling the growing global challenges of climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction, States will inevitably have to deal with questions of human mobility: (a) they will want to ensure that their response to these challenges, including in the area of urban planning, prevents forced displacements; (b) where displacement caused by environmental factors occurs, and where it crosses national borders, they will have to define some form of guidance or rules regarding the protection of the people displaced;⁶⁶ and (c) they should not overlook the role of facilitated migration – whether internal or international – and the remittances it can generate in helping households and communities adapt to the effects of climate change, preventing them from sliding back into poverty, or becoming “stuck” in areas that become uninhabitable or can no longer support their livelihoods because they lack the resources to move out of harm’s way.

Migration is already an adaptive strategy, as recognized in the Cancun Adaptation Framework. However, just as it serves to reduce household vulnerability at origin, it can contribute to generating increased vulnerability at destination. Evidence suggests that rural–urban migration over the coming decades will often be driven by environmental changes that make subsistence farming and other livelihoods relying on ecosystem services less viable. Yet, paradoxically, migrants will often end up more vulnerable to environmental hazards and shocks as they come to inhabit the most inhospitable, disaster-prone areas of a city, for instance informal settlements on deforested hillsides or on fragile river banks prone to erosion and flooding. Current statistics are alarming: two thirds of the cities with over 5 million inhabitants are situated in coastal areas that will be increasingly vulnerable to more intense weather conditions and sea-level rise. In many least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing States, major economic centres lie in such vulnerable areas, or, indeed, entire populations are under existential threat,

⁶⁶ The Nansen Initiative provides a first step in this direction. It is a State-led consultative process aimed at building consensus on a global protection agenda addressing the needs of people displaced across borders in the context of natural disasters. Co-led by Norway and Switzerland, as well as a wider group of friends, the Nansen Initiative follows up on the Cancun Agreements of December 2010 (COP16), in which States recognized climate change-induced migration, displacement and relocation as an adaptation challenge, and agreed to enhance their understanding and cooperation in this respect.

raising the unique challenge of a whole nation facing the prospect of displacement (Foresight, 2011).

6.5 Conclusion

The High-level Panel report marks an important milestone on the way to the post-2015 agenda, but the discussion is far from over. The Panel's narrative, centred on the need for a "new global partnership", combined with its universal framing of the post-2015 agenda provide clear openings for integrating migration alongside other global interdependencies.

The brief overview of potential global partnerships around migration and different development priorities presented in this chapter is far from exhaustive, but is intended to illustrate and spell out the relevance of human mobility to the broader post-2015 agenda. Migrants and migration make significant contributions to development and poverty reduction. A global partnership could instil momentum for greater international cooperation and coordination with a view to maximizing the benefits and minimizing the risks for all stakeholders involved in the migration process. In order to achieve this, such a partnership would need to revolve around at least one of three important levers:

- a. Better facilitation of movements by taking measures to reduce the upfront costs for migrants (for documentation and recruitment); investing in skills development; better matching of labour supply and demand across borders; and enhancing portability of qualifications and entitlements.
- b. Respect for the rights and advancement of the human development of migrants, including through effective consular protection, the enforcement of labour and due process rights, and access to services and social protection.
- c. Engagement of migrants and diasporas as development partners, including institutional structures for regular dialogue, and simple procedures and targeted products and services to facilitate migrant and diaspora savings and investments.

Beyond a global partnership, there are other ways in which migration and migrants could be included in the post-2015 agenda. For example, the High-level Panel report calls for the systematic disaggregation of development outcomes, so as to ensure that no one is left behind. This resonates well with the emphasis on inequalities and inclusion that has emerged from the United Nations facilitated global and national consultations on the post-2015 agenda, and it could translate into the systematic monitoring of migrants' human development outcomes in the future. Furthermore, there is scope for defining migration-related targets and measurable indicators under various thematic goals that are likely to feature in the post-2015 agenda.

The indicative framework of 12 goals and 54 targets that the High-level Panel has proposed can serve as a useful reference point to develop such “shadow targets”, as well as viable indicators on migration.

For example, under the central goal to end poverty, migration-related indicators could be introduced to support the proposed target on lowering the numbers of persons living on USD 1.25 a day and below national poverty lines. These could track the extent to which LDCs are covered by regional and bilateral labour mobility and trade in services agreements; or how many LDCs have access to low-cost transfer channels for migrant remittances and have linked those to other financial services for savings, investment and insurance. Remittances to LDCs amounted to nearly USD 27 billion in 2011 (UNCTAD, 2012a). Beyond their direct impact at the household level, for many LDCs remittances play an important role at the macroeconomic level. For example, in the median LCD, remittances account for as much as 2.1 per cent of GDP and 8.5 per cent of export earnings, as compared with 1.6 per cent and 4.5 per cent, respectively, for other developing countries (UNCTAD, 2012a). While remittances, by their very nature, are distinct from capital flows, they clearly play a significant role in providing foreign exchange for a large number of LDCs (UNCTAD, 2012b).

Under the proposed target to build resilience and reduce deaths from natural disasters, indicators could track the inclusion of migration and migrants in local planning in low-elevation coastal zones and other climate-vulnerable zones, as well as the inclusion of migration in country strategies on disaster risk reduction. The results of a research project conducted by the UK Government Office for Science gives an important underpinning in this regard (Foresight, 2011).

Given the gravity of the related human suffering and damage it inflicts on societies, a new target to prevent and eliminate all forms of human trafficking, especially trafficking in women and children, could be introduced under a number of the proposed goals, most appropriately perhaps under the goal to ensure good governance, or to ensure stable and peaceful societies, or to empower girls and women. Monitoring of progress could be based, among other factors, on the yearly reports of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially in women and children, but should also encompass a monitoring and reporting mechanism for business, which has an important role to play in tackling forced labour, including child labour, in global supply chains.

Under the goal to ensure healthy lives and the target to reduce the burden of disease from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, an essential indicator will be to track if migrants, regardless of their status, have equal access to preventative and curative health services. The implementation of the 2008 World Health Assembly resolution on the health of migrants could provide the structure for monitoring progress.

Beyond these examples, the annex to this chapter provides a maximalist sketch of how migration could be included at the target or indicator level in the High-level Panel list of 12 indicative goals. Yet, much more work will need to be done to flesh out these suggestions to ensure that indicators are measurable and assess what kind of data and capacities would be needed to track them. This more in-depth work on targets and indicators will have to go hand in hand with continuous advocacy around the idea of a global partnership. Only the latter captures the kind of explicit commitment to international cooperation among States and with other stakeholders which is needed to deal with the inherently transnational phenomenon of migration.

When realizing the vision of a partnership on human mobility, we are not starting from scratch; freedom of movement and establishment is a key goal for all regional integration processes, from MERCOSUR to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Among the more notable arrangements are the common labour markets in the European economic area and the dismantled internal borders in the Schengen area. These are major, by now politically irreversible, achievements that go far beyond sheer macroeconomics. Wherever needed, and as appropriate, such integration ambitions should be supported by the international community. Building on existing platforms for dialogue at regional and global levels, such as regional consultative processes and the GFMD, it will be important to identify and advance partnerships in specific areas of convergence, where States and other stakeholders are indicating or have shown a willingness to cooperate multilaterally, carried forward by a small group of States and allies (e.g. the Nansen Initiative). The main point is that the existing body of good practices and experiences can be built upon now, pre-2015, and provide a strong platform for a migration-related partnership commitment to emerge in the post-2015 process.

Annex: Suggested migration related development targets and indicators

Possible targets and indicators related to human mobility based on the illustrative goals and targets proposed by the High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda

Goal 1: End poverty

Target 1a: Bring the number of people living on less than \$1.25 a day to zero and reduce by x% the share of people living below their country's 2015 national poverty line

Possible migration-related indicators:

- Cost of remittance transfers to LDCs
- Number of LDCs that link remittances to local community development and access to financial services
- Number of LDCs participating in regional and bilateral labour mobility and trade in services agreements

Target 1d: Build resilience and reduce deaths from natural disasters by x%

Possible migration-related indicators:

- Inclusion of migration in local planning in low-elevation coastal zones and other climate-vulnerable zones
- Inclusion of migration in disaster risk reduction strategies

Goal 4: Ensure healthy lives

Target 4e: Reduce the burden of disease from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, neglected tropical diseases and priority non-communicable diseases

Possible migration-related indicator:

- Number of countries that grant migrants, regardless of their status, equal access to preventative and curative health services

Goal 8: Create jobs, sustainable livelihoods, and equitable growth

Target 8b: Decrease the number of young people not in education, employment or training by x%

Possible migration-related indicator:

- Percentage of young people who receive skills development training and have access to foreign employment

Target 8c: Strengthen productive capacity by providing universal access to financial services and infrastructure such as transportation and ICT

Possible migration-related indicators:

- Percentage of migrant remittances transferred using new technologies
- Percentage of migrant remittance senders and receivers with access to other financial services
- Rates of financial literacy of senders and receivers of remittances

Target 8d: Increase new start-ups by x and value added from new products by y through creating an enabling business environment and boosting entrepreneurship

Possible migration-related indicator:

- Number of businesses created through migrant remittances or diaspora investment

Goal 10: Ensure good governance and effective institutions

PROPOSED NEW TARGET – 10f: Prevent and eliminate all forms of human trafficking, especially trafficking in women and children

Possible migration-related indicators:

- Number of prosecutions relating to human trafficking
- Number of countries having special visa protections for victims of trafficking
- Number of businesses screening their supply chains for forced labour, especially child labour

Goal 11: Ensure stable and peaceful societies

Target 11c: Stem the external stressors that lead to conflict, including those related to organized crime

Possible migration-related indicator:

- Existence of frameworks at all levels for managing large-scale population displacements

Target 11d: Enhance the capacity, professionalism and accountability of the security forces, police and judiciary

Possible migration-related indicator:

- Number of countries that have adopted codes of conduct and provide human rights training for border enforcement agencies and personnel

Goal 12: Create a global enabling environment and catalyse long-term finance

Target 12b: Implement reforms to ensure stability of the global financial system and encourage stable, long-term private foreign investment

Possible migration-related indicator:

- Number of countries that have issued diaspora bonds and volume of funds invested

Target 12f: Promote collaboration on and access to science, technology, innovation, and development data

Possible migration-related indicator:

- Number of countries with established expatriate/diaspora networks to facilitate the circulation of knowledge, ideas and technology

PROPOSED NEW TARGET – 12g: Create cooperative agreements related to human mobility to enable safe, lawful, less costly migration across or within borders

Possible migration-related indicators:

- Number of arrangements for freedom of movement under regional integration frameworks and number of people moving under those agreements

- Existence of provisions for the protection of migrants' rights under mobility agreements
- Number of national laws and international agreements on the recognition of foreign qualifications and number of foreign qualifications recognized
- Number of agreements concerning the portability of benefits and number of people covered, or volume of funds transferred, under those agreements
- Costs for documentation, visas and recruitment borne by migrants

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